CVE-2026-45045

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.005 · 40 %ileEUFRUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.46% (40th) EPSS
CVSS 5.3 · medium
Is it mine?
6 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 1.4
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (6)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (3)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-gcfq-8gqf-4876GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward2026-07-02ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary The `BalancerForward` proxy helper in GoFiber uses `Header.Add()` instead of `Header.Set()` when injecting the `X-Real-IP` header. This appends the real client IP as a second header value rather than replacing any attacker-supplied value. Upstream servers that read the first `X-Real-IP` header (nginx, Express, most HTTP servers) use the attacker's spoofed IP for logging, rate limiting, and access control. ## Vulnerable Code **File:** `middleware/proxy/proxy.go`, lines 270-285 ```go func BalancerForward(servers []string, clients ...*fasthttp.Client) fiber.Handler { r := &roundrobin{ current: 0, pool: servers, } return func(c fiber.Ctx) error { server := r.get() if !strings.HasPrefix(server, "http") { server = "http://" + server } c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) // line 282: Add, not Set return Do(c, server+c.OriginalURL(), clients...) } } ``` ## Data Flow 1. Attacker sends request with `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` (spoofed internal IP) 2. `BalancerForward` handler executes at line 282 3. `c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP())` APPENDS the real IP as a second header 4. Upstream server receives: `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` AND `X-Real-IP: <real-attacker-ip>` 5. Most HTTP servers (nginx, Node.js, Apache) read the FIRST value 6. Upstream uses `10.0.0.1` for all IP-dependent logic ## Impact - **Rate limit bypass:** IP-based rate limiting at the upstream uses the spoofed IP, allowing unlimited requests - **IP ACL bypass:** Internal IP allowlists (e.g., admin panels restricted to `10.0.0.0/8`) can be bypassed - **Audit log poisoning:** Security logs record the spoofed IP, making incident investigation unreliable - **Geolocation bypass:** IP-based geofencing or region restrictions are circumvented ## Fix Replace `Header.Add()` with `Header.Set()` at line 282: ```go c.Request().Header.Set("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) ``` `Header.Set()` replaces any existing header value, ensuring only the real client IP is forwarded.

  • CERTFR-2026-AVI-1385Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits VMwareFrançais2026-10-26vendor · certfrFR
  • GO-2026-5887GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward in github.com/gofiber/fiber2026-07-24vendor · osvUS

    GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward in github.com/gofiber/fiber

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-07-08modified 2026-10-25
08

references (22)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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