CVE-2026-44488

Atlassian heeft kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse producten zoals Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Jira, Crowd en Fisheye. De kwetsbaarheden bevinden zich in diverse Third-Party producten waar eerder updates voor zijn verschenen. Atlassian heeft deze updates verwerkt in de eigen producten.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye, Crucible, Jira und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye, Crucible, Jira und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Atlassian Bitbucket, Atlassian Confluence, Atlassian Crucible, Atlassian Fisheye und Atlassian Jira ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Concert ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM MQ Appliance ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) durchzuführen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen.

## Summary Axios versions `1.7.0` through `1.15.x` did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the `fetch` adapter. Applications that selected `adapter: 'fetch'`, or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large `data:` URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on `maxBodyLength` as a boundary. ## Impact The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources. This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` default to `-1`. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them. Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion. ## Affected Functionality Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in `fetch` adapter with finite `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` values. Relevant configurations include: - `adapter: 'fetch'` - `adapter: ['fetch', ...]` when `fetch` is selected - environments where neither `xhr` nor `http` is available and axios falls back to `fetch` - custom fetch environments configured through `env.fetch` Unaffected functionality includes: - Node.js default `http` adapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced - configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits ## Technical Details In vulnerable versions, `lib/adapters/fetch.js` destructured request config without `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength`. The adapter dispatched `fetch()` and then materialized the response through `text()`, `arrayBuffer()`, `blob()`, or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit. The fix in `e5540dc` added: - `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` reads in `lib/adapters/fetch.js` - upfront `data:` URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch - `Content-Length` response pre-checks - streaming response enforcement - fallback checks for environments without `ReadableStream` - regression tests in `tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js` ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'node:http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let received = 0; req.on('data', chunk => { received += chunk.length; }); req.on('end', () => { res.end(JSON.stringify({ received })); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve)); const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`; await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), { adapter: 'fetch', maxBodyLength: 1024 }); // Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes. // Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST. server.close(); ``` ## Workarounds Use the Node.js `http` adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant. Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios. Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially `data:` URLs, before calling axios. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage. ### Details maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow: - lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits. ### PoC Environment: - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2 - Node v24.2.0 Steps: 1. Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}. 2. Send 2 MiB with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxBodyLength: 1024 3. Request a 4 KiB data: URL with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxContentLength: 16 Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed: - Upload: success, server received 2097152 - data: response: success, length 4096 ### Impact Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes. </details> ---