CVE-2026-43585
criticalpriority · track · 39EPSS 0.005 · 45 %ileDEEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-26
OpenClaw before 2026.4.15 captures resolved bearer-auth configuration at startup, allowing revoked tokens to remain valid after SecretRef rotation. Gateway HTTP and WebSocket handlers fail to re-resolve authentication per-request, enabling attackers to use rotated-out bearer tokens for unauthorized gateway access.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · high–critical · 7.2–9.8
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (5)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (2)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-1161OpenClaw: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-04-16csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um erweiterte Rechte zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.
- GHSA-xmxx-7p24-h892OpenClaw: Gateway HTTP endpoints re-resolve bearer auth after SecretRef rotation2026-04-17ghsa · osvUS
## Summary Gateway HTTP and WebSocket handlers captured the resolved bearer-auth configuration when the server started. After a SecretRef rotation, the already-running gateway could continue accepting the old bearer token until restart. ## Impact A bearer token that should have been revoked by SecretRef rotation could remain valid on the gateway HTTP and upgrade surfaces for the lifetime of the process. Severity remains high because the old token could continue to authorize gateway requests after operators believed it was rotated out. ## Affected versions - Affected: `< 2026.4.15` - Patched: `2026.4.15` ## Fix OpenClaw `2026.4.15` resolves active gateway auth from the runtime secret snapshot per request and per upgrade instead of using a stale startup-time value. Verified in `v2026.4.15`: - `src/gateway/server.impl.ts` exposes `getResolvedAuth()` backed by the current runtime secret snapshot. - `src/gateway/server-http.ts` calls `getResolvedAuth()` for each HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade before running auth checks. - `src/gateway/server-http.probe.test.ts` verifies `/ready` re-resolves bearer auth after rotation and rejects the old token. Fix commit included in `v2026.4.15` and absent from `v2026.4.14`: - `acd4e0a32f12e1ad85f3130f63b42443ce90f094` via PR #66651 Thanks to @zsxsoft, Keen Security Lab, and @qclawer for reporting this issue.
also known as (3)
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sources
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references (8)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43585cnnvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/acd4e0a32f12e1ad85f3130f63b42443ce90f094enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xmxx-7p24-h892enisa_euvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-bearer-token-validation-bypass-via-stale-secretref-resolutionenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/acd4e0a32f12e1ad85f3130f63b42443ce90f094Patchnvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xmxx-7p24-h892MitigationVendor Advisorynvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-bearer-token-validation-bypass-via-stale-secretref-resolutionThird Party Advisorynvd
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