CVE-2026-42584

criticalpriority · track · 36EPSS 0.007 · 53 %ileDEEUFRRUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.72% (53rd) EPSS
CVSS 9.1 · critical
Is it mine?
65 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
6 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · cert_bund

EPSS · scored 2026-10-22

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · high–critical · 7.3–9.1

v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 5.2
v3.19.1criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.4
v3.17.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondaryexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.4
v3.17.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v3.18.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (65)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 65
05

advisories (4)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1372Netty: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-05-05csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1955Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye, Crucible, Jira und Jira Service Management: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-06-16csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye, Crucible, Jira und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

  • GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronization2026-05-07ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's. ### Details HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. Prerequisites - HTTP/1.1 pipelining - HEAD in the pipeline - The server sends 1xx ### PoC ```java @Test public void test() { EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec()); assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1"))); ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound(); request.release(); assertNull(channel.readOutbound()); assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2"))); request = channel.readOutbound(); request.release(); assertNull(channel.readOutbound()); String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n"; assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII))); // Response 1 HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status()); LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes()); last.release(); // Response 2 response = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status()); last = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes()); last.release(); // Response 3 FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure()); assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes()); response1.release(); assertFalse(channel.finish()); } ``` ### Impact Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.

  • CERTFR-2026-AVI-1336Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits IBMFrançais2026-10-16vendor · certfrFR
06

also known as (5)

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07

sources

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08

references (21)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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