CVE-2026-42203

highpriority · attend · 45EPSS 0.004 · 31 %ileexploit · PoCDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
1 exploit · PoC
Likely / severe?
0.37% (31st) EPSS
CVSS 8.8 · high
Is it mine?
5 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · cert_bund

EPSS · scored 2026-10-26

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.80.5 to before version 1.83.7, the POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

8.8
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.18.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 2.8 · impact 5.9
v3.18.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondaryexploitability 2.8 · impact 5.9
v4.08.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.08.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.07.3highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

exploits (1)

Public proof-of-concept and weaponised exploit code.

05

affected products (5)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

06

advisories (3)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1422LiteLLM: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Codeausführung und Offenlegung von InformationenDeutsch2026-05-07csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in LiteLLM ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, und um Informationen offenzulegen.

  • GHSA-xqmj-j6mv-4862LiteLLM: Server-Side Template Injection in /prompts/test endpoint2026-04-24ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The `POST /prompts/test` endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host. Proxy deployments running an affected version are in scope. ### Patches The issue is fixed in **`1.83.7-stable`**. The fix switches the prompt template renderer to a sandboxed environment that blocks the attributes this attack relies on. LiteLLM recommends upgrading to `1.83.7-stable` or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: 1. Block `POST /prompts/test` at your reverse proxy or API gateway. 2. Review and rotate API keys that should not have access to prompt management routes.

  • PYSEC-2026-2602LiteLLM: Server-Side Template Injection in /prompts/test endpoint2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Impact The `POST /prompts/test` endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host. Proxy deployments running an affected version are in scope. ### Patches The issue is fixed in **`1.83.7-stable`**. The fix switches the prompt template renderer to a sandboxed environment that blocks the attributes this attack relies on. LiteLLM recommends upgrading to `1.83.7-stable` or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: 1. Block `POST /prompts/test` at your reverse proxy or API gateway. 2. Review and rotate API keys that should not have access to prompt management routes.

07

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

08

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-05-08modified 2026-10-26
09

references (9)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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