CVE-2026-41890

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 36 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.43% (36th) EPSS
CVSS 6.9 · medium
Is it mine?
2 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-23

CI4MS is a CodeIgniter 4-based CMS skeleton that delivers a production-ready, modular architecture with RBAC authorization and theme support. From version 0.31.1.0 to before version 0.31.8.0, the deleteProcess() action accepts a POST parameter tables[] containing arbitrary table names. These are passed directly to $forge->dropTable() without validating that the tables belong to the theme being deleted. The deleteConfirm view correctly populates tables[] from the theme's own migration files, but the server-side deleteProcess does not verify the received values against those files. An authenticated admin can craft a POST request with arbitrary table names and drop any table in the database. This issue has been patched in version 0.31.8.0.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.9
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.04.6mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

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04

affected products (2)

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05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-vgrf-pr28-vf98CI4MS Vulnerable to Arbitrary Database Table Drop via Theme deleteProcess2026-05-04ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary The `deleteProcess()` action accepts a POST parameter `tables[]` containing arbitrary table names. These are passed directly to `$forge->dropTable()` without validating that the tables belong to the theme being deleted. The `deleteConfirm` view correctly populates `tables[]` from the theme's own migration files, but the server-side `deleteProcess` does not verify the received values against those files. An authenticated admin can craft a POST request with arbitrary table names and drop any table in the database. This is a real bug even within the admin trust model: the action should be scoped to the theme's own tables. The permission grants delete this theme's data", not "drop any table". ### Details ### Location `modules/Theme/Controllers/Theme.php` :: `deleteProcess()` ~line 147 ### Vulnerable Code ```php public function deleteProcess(string $slug) { $themeName = $slug; $activeTheme = setting('App.siteTheme'); if ($activeTheme === $themeName) { return redirect()->route('templateSettings')...; } $tablesToDrop = $this->request->getPost('tables'); // ← user-supplied, unvalidated if (!empty($tablesToDrop) && is_array($tablesToDrop)) { $forge = \Config\Database::forge(); $db = \Config\Database::connect(); foreach ($tablesToDrop as $table) { if ($db->tableExists($table)) { $forge->dropTable($table, true); // ← no whitelist check } } } ``` ### PoC 1. Authenticate to the backend (any user with theme.delete permission) 2. POST to `/backend/themes/delete-process/<any_non_active_theme_slug>` 3. Include `tables[]=<any_table>` in POST body 4. The named tables are dropped without validation ### Impact - Dropped `ci4ms_blog` (confirmed in test) - Dropped `ci4ms_users` + `ci4ms_auth_identities` simultaneously — disables all authentication (confirmed) - Any table in the database can be targeted ### Additional note Quick note on the design intent for deleteProcess — I noticed delete_confirm.php scopes the checkboxes to the theme's own migration files, and the CHANGELOG confirms the selective deletion was intentional (admins can choose which tables to keep). The server-side deleteProcess already has all the information it needs to validate the input — deleteConfirm derives the valid table set from the migration files, deleteProcess just needs to do the same before acting on the POST. Happy to clarify if useful.

06

also known as (3)

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07

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published 2026-05-07modified 2026-06-17
08

references (6)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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