CVE-2026-35667
mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.001 · 4 %ileDEEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27486 where the !stop chat command uses an unpatched killProcessTree function from shell-utils.ts that sends SIGKILL immediately without graceful SIGTERM shutdown. Attackers can trigger process termination via the !stop command, causing data corruption, resource leaks, and skipped security-sensitive cleanup operations.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
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weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (5)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (2)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-1065OpenClaw: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-04-12csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.
- GHSA-3298-56p6-rpw2OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in `!stop` Chat Command via `shell-utils.ts`2026-03-30ghsa · osvUS
> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. ### Advisory Details **Title**: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in `!stop` Chat Command via `shell-utils.ts` **Description**: ### Summary The `!stop` (and `/bash stop`) chat command kills background bash processes using `SIGKILL` directly, without first sending `SIGTERM` to allow graceful shutdown. This is because `bash-command.ts` imports `killProcessTree()` from `src/agents/shell-utils.ts`, which still contains the pre-CVE-2026-27486 aggressive kill logic, rather than from the patched `src/process/kill-tree.ts`. ### Details CVE-2026-27486 fixed unsafe process termination by introducing a graceful shutdown sequence in `src/process/kill-tree.ts` — sending `SIGTERM` first, waiting a configurable grace period (default 3 seconds), then escalating to `SIGKILL` only if the process is still alive. However, an identical copy of the **unpatched** `killProcessTree` function remains in `src/agents/shell-utils.ts` (lines 170–192). This function sends `SIGKILL` immediately with no `SIGTERM`: ```typescript // src/agents/shell-utils.ts:170-192 export function killProcessTree(pid: number): void { // ... Windows handling ... try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); // Immediate hard kill, no SIGTERM } catch { try { process.kill(pid, "SIGKILL"); } catch { // process already dead } } } ``` The `!stop` chat command handler in `src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts` imports and calls this vulnerable version at line 302: ```typescript // src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:5 import { killProcessTree } from "../../agents/shell-utils.js"; // src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:300-304 const pid = running.pid ?? running.child?.pid; if (pid) { killProcessTree(pid); // Calls the UNPATCHED version } markExited(running, null, "SIGKILL", "failed"); ``` Compare this to the patched version in `src/process/kill-tree.ts`: ```typescript // src/process/kill-tree.ts:46-78 function killProcessTreeUnix(pid: number, graceMs: number): void { // Step 1: Try graceful SIGTERM to process group try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGTERM"); } catch { /* ... */ } // Step 2: Wait grace period, then SIGKILL if still alive setTimeout(() => { if (isProcessAlive(-pid)) { try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); } catch { /* ... */ } } }, graceMs).unref(); } ``` ### PoC This PoC demonstrates the difference between the vulnerable and patched code paths inside a running OpenClaw Gateway container. **Setup:** ```bash # Build and start the gateway container cd CVE-2026-27486-variant-exp/ docker compose up -d sleep 5 ``` **Exploit (vulnerable `killProcessTree` from `shell-utils.ts`):** The following script is injected into the container and executed. It starts a bash process that traps `SIGTERM` for graceful shutdown, then kills it using the same code path as `!stop`: ```javascript // exploit_sigkill.cjs — replicates src/agents/shell-utils.ts:183-190 const { spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); try { fs.unlinkSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt'); } catch {} const child = spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c', 'trap \'echo GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN > /tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt; exit 0\' SIGTERM; while true; do sleep 1; done' ], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }); child.unref(); setTimeout(() => { // VULNERABLE: same as shell-utils.ts — SIGKILL only try { process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch { try { process.kill(child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {} } setTimeout(() => { if (fs.existsSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt')) { console.log('[BLOCKED] SIGTERM was received.'); process.exit(1); } else { console.log('[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.'); process.exit(0); } }, 2000); }, 1000); ``` **Run:** ```bash python3 poc_exploit.py ``` ### Log of Evidence **Exploit output (SIGKILL only, no graceful shutdown):** ``` [*] Running exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts)... [*] Victim PID: 78 [*] Calling vulnerable killProcessTree (SIGKILL only, no SIGTERM)... [EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered. [EXPLOITED] Graceful shutdown handler was NEVER invoked. [SUCCESS] CVE-2026-27486 variant confirmed: killProcessTree() in shell-utils.ts sends immediate SIGKILL, bypassing the graceful shutdown fix in process/kill-tree.ts. ``` **Control output (SIGTERM first, graceful shutdown works):** ``` [*] Running control (patched killProcessTree from process/kill-tree.ts)... [*] Victim PID: 93 [*] Calling patched killProcessTree (SIGTERM first, then SIGKILL after grace)... [NORMAL] SIGTERM received — graceful shutdown completed. Flag: GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN [NORMAL] Control confirmed: patched killProcessTree sends SIGTERM first, allowing graceful shutdown before escalating to SIGKILL. ``` ### Impact When `!stop` is used, background processes are killed instantly via `SIGKILL` with no chance to perform cleanup. This can result in: - **Data corruption**: processes writing to files or databases are interrupted mid-write - **Resource leaks**: temporary files, lock files, and network connections are not properly released - **Security-sensitive cleanup skipped**: operations like erasing in-memory secrets or completing audit logs are bypassed This is the same class of impact that CVE-2026-27486 was filed for — the fix simply missed the `shell-utils.ts` copy of the function. ### Affected products - **Ecosystem**: npm - **Package name**: openclaw - **Affected versions**: <= 2026.3.14 - **Patched versions**: <None> ### Severity - **Severity**: Medium - **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H ### Weaknesses - **CWE**: CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release ### Occurrences | Permalink | Description | | :--- | :--- | | [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/agents/shell-utils.ts#L170-L192](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/agents/shell-utils.ts#L170-L192) | The vulnerable `killProcessTree` function that sends immediate `SIGKILL` without `SIGTERM`. | | [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L5](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L5) | Import statement pulling the vulnerable `killProcessTree` from `shell-utils.ts` instead of the patched `kill-tree.ts`. | | [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L300-L304](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L300-L304) | The `!stop` handler calling the vulnerable `killProcessTree(pid)`. | | [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/process/kill-tree.ts#L46-L78](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/process/kill-tree.ts#L46-L78) | The **patched** `killProcessTreeUnix` with graceful `SIGTERM` → grace period → `SIGKILL` sequence (for reference). |
also known as (3)
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sources
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references (7)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3298-56p6-rpw2cnnvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-improper-process-termination-via-unpatched-killprocesstree-in-shell-utils-tscnnvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3298-56p6-rpw2enisa_euvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-improper-process-termination-via-unpatched-killprocesstree-in-shell-utils-tsenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3298-56p6-rpw2ExploitVendor Advisorynvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-improper-process-termination-via-unpatched-killprocesstree-in-shell-utils-tsThird Party Advisorynvd
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