CVE-2026-35605

highpriority · track · 30EPSS 0.004 · 33 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.39% (33rd) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
4 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.1, the Matches() function in rules/rules.go uses strings.HasPrefix() without a trailing directory separator when matching paths against access rules. A rule for /uploads also matches /uploads_backup/, granting or denying access to unintended directories. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.1.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–high · 1.7–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Nsecondaryexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (4)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-5q48-q4fm-g3m6File Browser has an access rule bypass via HasPrefix without trailing separator in path matching2026-04-08ghsa · osvUS

    Hi, The `Matches()` function in `rules/rules.go` uses `strings.HasPrefix()` without a trailing directory separator when matching paths against access rules. A rule for `/uploads` also matches `/uploads_backup/`, granting or denying access to unintended directories. Verified against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d). ## Details At `rules/rules.go:29-35`: func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool { if r.Regex { return r.Regexp.MatchString(path) } return strings.HasPrefix(path, r.Path) } When a rule has `Path: "/uploads"`, any path starting with `/uploads` matches, including `/uploads_backup/secret.txt`. The regex variant at line 31 uses proper matching, but the non-regex path uses a prefix check without ensuring the match ends at a directory boundary. The `Check()` function at `http/data.go:29-48` iterates all rules with last-match-wins semantics. No secondary validation exists beyond this prefix check. ## PoC Admin configures: allow rule `Path: "/shared"` for a restricted user. Filesystem contains: - `/shared/` (intended to be accessible) - `/shared_private/` (intended to be restricted) User requests `/shared_private/secret.txt`: - `strings.HasPrefix("/shared_private/secret.txt", "/shared")` returns true - Allow rule applies - Access granted to the unintended directory ## Impact Authenticated users can access files in sibling directories that share a common prefix with an allowed directory, bypassing the admin's intended access configuration. ## Prior art Prior advisories GHSA-4mh3-h929-w968 (path-based access control bypass) and GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp (path traversal in copy/rename) addressed related access control issues. This HasPrefix prefix-collision is a distinct, unreported variant. ## Suggested Fix func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool { if r.Regex { return r.Regexp.MatchString(path) } prefix := r.Path if prefix != "/" && !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, "/") { prefix += "/" } return path == r.Path || strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix) } Koda Reef --- **Update:** Fix submitted as PR #5889.

  • GO-2026-5150File Browser has an access rule bypass via HasPrefix without trailing separator in path matching in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser2026-06-25vendor · osvUS

    File Browser has an access rule bypass via HasPrefix without trailing separator in path matching in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-04-07modified 2026-06-17
08

references (7)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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