CVE-2026-35445

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 38 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.44% (38th) EPSS
CVSS 7.1 · high
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-28

Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. In versions prior to 1.2.13, the backend did not validate the handler name submitted through the form postback _handler POST field, allowing an authenticated backend user to invoke arbitrary controller methods, including protected, private, and action-prefixed ones. While AJAX requests validate that handler names match the on[A-Z][\w+]* pattern, the postback path passed the submitted _handler value straight to the handler dispatcher with no such check, so any controller that exposes a public action or conditionally relaxes its $requiredPermissions check could be reached, bypassing the roles and permissions system. The built-in Users controller was affected because it set $requiredPermissions to null for the myaccount action, letting any authenticated backend user invoke user-management methods such as update_onDelete and update_onManualPasswordReset without holding the backend.manage_users permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.13.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4–7.1

v4.07.1highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.04mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-j5jq-cr68-v2xxWinter: Authenticated backend users can bypass Users controller permission checks2026-08-12ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact Affected versions of Winter CMS did not validate the handler name submitted through the form postback mechanism (`_handler` POST field) in the same way as AJAX requests (`X_WINTER_REQUEST_HANDLER` header). The AJAX path validates that handler names match the `on[A-Z][\w+]*` pattern, but the postback path passed the handler name directly to the handler dispatcher with no validation. This allowed an authenticated backend user to call any method on a controller — including action-prefixed, protected, and private methods — by submitting a crafted POST request with a `_handler` field, as long as the controller either: - Contains a publicly available action via the `$publicActions` property, or - Degrades or removes the `$requiredPermissions` check in its constructor based on a condition The backend's own Users controller was affected by the second scenario: it set `$requiredPermissions` to `null` for the `myaccount` action, allowing any authenticated backend user to access the controller without the `backend.manage_users` permission. Combined with the postback bypass, this allowed calling controller methods such as `update_onDelete`, `update_onRestore`, `update_onUnsuspendUser`, and `update_onManualPasswordReset` with attacker-controlled parameters. Note that CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so the attacker must be logged into the backend with a valid session. To actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any level of access. The Winter CMS maintainers strongly recommend that all Winter CMS sites that have any reliance on the roles & permissions system to update immediately. Security fixes have been backported to all major versions of Winter (1.0, 1.1, and 1.2). ### Patches The postback handler path now validates handler names using the same rules as the AJAX path. The My Account functionality has been moved to a dedicated controller that does not expose user management methods. Defence in depth has been applied at the model level to prevent unauthorized user record modifications regardless of the entry point. This security issue has been fixed as of v1.2.13. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade, they may apply the following changes to their Winter CMS installation manually to resolve this issue: 1. In `modules/backend/classes/Controller.php`, validate the `_handler` POST field against the `on[A-Z][\w+]*` pattern before passing it to `runAjaxHandler()`. 2. In `modules/backend/controllers/Users.php`, remove the conditional that sets `$requiredPermissions` to `null` for the `myaccount` action.

06

sources

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published 2026-08-26modified 2026-08-26
07

references (3) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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