CVE-2026-34986

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.007 · 51 %ileDEEUFRUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.65% (51st) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
68 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · cert_bund

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondaryexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (68)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 68
05

advisories (5)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1268Red Hat Enterprise Linux (go-jose): Schwachstelle ermöglicht Denial of ServiceDeutsch2026-04-26csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-2929Splunk Splunk Enterprise: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-08-19csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Splunk Splunk Enterprise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Berechtigungen zu erweitern, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, SQL-Injection-, serverseitige Request-Forgery- und Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, sensible Informationen offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände auszulösen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.

  • GHSA-78h2-9frx-2jm8Go JOSE Panics in JWE decryption2026-04-03ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact Decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the `alg` field indicates a key wrapping algorithm ([one ending in `KW`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4#pkg-constants), with the exception of `A128GCMKW`, `A192GCMKW`, and `A256GCMKW`) and the `encrypted_key` field is empty. The panic happens when `cipher.KeyUnwrap()` in `key_wrap.go` attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the `encrypted_key`. This code path is reachable from `ParseEncrypted()` / `ParseEncryptedJSON()` / `ParseEncryptedCompact()` followed by `Decrypt()` on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling `cipher.KeyUnwrap()` directly with any `ciphertext` parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. ### Fixed In 4.1.4 and v3.0.5 ### Workarounds If the list of `keyAlgorithms` passed to `ParseEncrypted()` / `ParseEncryptedJSON()` / `ParseEncryptedCompact()` does not include key wrapping algorithms (those ending in `KW`), your application is unaffected. If your application uses key wrapping, you can prevalidate to the JWE objects to ensure the `encrypted_key` field is nonempty. If your application accepts JWE Compact Serialization, apply that validation to the corresponding field of that serialization (the data between the first and second `.`). ### Thanks Thanks to Datadog's Security team for finding this issue.

  • CERTFR-2026-AVI-1385Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits VMwareFrançais2026-10-26vendor · certfrFR
  • GO-2026-4945Go JOSE Panics in JWE decryption in github.com/go-jose/go-jose2026-05-26vendor · osvUS

    The go-jose package is subject to a panic when decrypting certain JSON Web Encryption (JWE) tokens. This occurs when an attacker can provide a maliciously crafted JWE token that triggers an unhandled exception during the decryption process, leading to a denial-of-service.

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-04-06modified 2026-10-23
08

references (156)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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