CVE-2026-34765

### Impact When a renderer calls `window.open()` with a target name, Electron did not correctly scope the named-window lookup to the opener's browsing context group. A renderer could navigate an existing child window that was opened by a different, unrelated renderer if both used the same target name. If that existing child was created with more permissive `webPreferences` (via `setWindowOpenHandler`'s `overrideBrowserWindowOptions`), content loaded by the second renderer inherits those permissions. Apps are only affected if they open multiple top-level windows with differing trust levels **and** use `setWindowOpenHandler` to grant child windows elevated `webPreferences` such as a privileged preload script. Apps that do not elevate child window privileges, or that use a single top-level window, are not affected. Apps that additionally grant `nodeIntegration: true` or `sandbox: false` to child windows (contrary to the [security recommendations](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/security)) may be exposed to arbitrary code execution. ### Workarounds Deny `window.open()` in renderers that load untrusted content by returning `{ action: 'deny' }` from `setWindowOpenHandler`. Avoid granting child windows more permissive `webPreferences` than their opener. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-alpha.5` * `41.1.0` * `40.8.5` * `39.8.5` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)