CVE-2026-33940

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise Certified Container ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen oder Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM InfoSphere Data Replication ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.

## Summary A crafted object placed in the template context can bypass all conditional guards in `resolvePartial()` and cause `invokePartial()` to return `undefined`. The Handlebars runtime then treats the unresolved partial as a source that needs to be compiled, passing the crafted object to `env.compile()`. Because the object is a valid Handlebars AST containing injected code, the generated JavaScript executes arbitrary commands on the server. The attack requires the adversary to control a value that can be returned by a dynamic partial lookup. ## Description The vulnerable code path spans two functions in `lib/handlebars/runtime.js`: **`resolvePartial()`:** A crafted object with `call: true` satisfies the first branch condition (`partial.call`) and causes an early return of the original object itself, because none of the remaining conditionals (string check, `options.partials` lookup, etc.) match a plain object. The function returns the crafted object as-is. **`invokePartial()`:** When `resolvePartial` returns a non-function object, `invokePartial` produces `undefined`. The runtime interprets `undefined` as "partial not yet compiled" and calls `env.compile(partial, ...)` where `partial` is the crafted AST object. The JavaScript code generator processes the AST and emits JavaScript containing the injected payload, which is then evaluated. **Minimum prerequisites:** 1. The template uses a dynamic partial lookup: `{{> (lookup . "key")}}` or equivalent. 2. The adversary can set the value of the looked-up context property to a crafted object. In server-side rendering scenarios where templates process user-supplied context data, this enables full Remote Code Execution. ## Proof of Concept ```javascript const Handlebars = require('handlebars'); const vulnerableTemplate = `{{> (lookup . "payload")}}`; const maliciousContext = { payload: { call: true, // bypasses the primary resolvePartial branch type: "Program", body: [ { type: "MustacheStatement", depth: 0, path: { type: "PathExpression", parts: ["pop"], original: "this.pop", // Injected code breaks out of the generated function's argument list depth: "0])),function () {console.error('VULNERABLE: object -> dynamic partial -> RCE');}()));//", }, }, ], }, }; Handlebars.compile(vulnerableTemplate)(maliciousContext); // Prints: VULNERABLE: object -> dynamic partial -> RCE ``` ## Workarounds - **Use the runtime-only build** (`require('handlebars/runtime')`). Without `compile()`, the fallback compilation path in `invokePartial` is unreachable. - **Sanitize context data** before rendering: ensure no value in the context is a non-primitive object that could be passed to a dynamic partial. - **Avoid dynamic partial lookups** (`{{> (lookup ...)}}`) when context data is user-controlled.