CVE-2026-33228

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Splunk SOAR ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.

--- **Summary** The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "\_\_proto\_\_" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype. --- **Root Cause** File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js) ``` const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => { for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) { const k = ke[y]; const value = output[k]; if (value instanceof Primitive) { const tmp = input[value]; // Bug is here ``` No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "\_\_proto\_\_" resolves to Array.prototype, which: - has type "object" → passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30 - is not in the parsed Set yet → passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard. - The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object. --- **Replication Steps** ``` const Flatted = require('flatted'); const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]'); parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned'; console.log([].polluted); // Returns true ``` --- **Impact** An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution. **Recommended solution** Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it: // Before (vulnerable) const tmp = input[value]; // After (safe) const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String → number const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length) ? input[idx] : undefined;