CVE-2026-32761

### Summary A permission enforcement flaw allows users without download privileges (`download=false`) to still expose and retrieve file content via public share links when they retain share privileges (`share=true`). This bypasses intended access control policy and enables unauthorized data exfiltration to unauthenticated users. Where download restrictions are used for data-loss prevention or role separation. ### Details The backend applies inconsistent authorization checks across download paths: - Direct raw download correctly enforces `Perm.Download`: - [[raw.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/raw.go#82)](filebrowser/http/raw.go:82) - Share creation only enforces `Perm.Share`: - [[share.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/share.go#21)](filebrowser/http/share.go:21) - Public share/download handlers serve shared content without verifying owner `Perm.Download`: - [public.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/public.go#18)(filebrowser/http/public.go:18) - [public.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/public.go#116)(filebrowser/http/public.go:116) As a result, a user who is blocked from direct downloads can create a share and obtain the same file via `/api/public/dl/<hash>`. ### PoC 1. Create a non-admin user with: - `perm.share = true` - `perm.download = false` 2. Login as that user and upload a **PDF** file: - `POST /api/resources/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` with `Content-Type: application/pdf` 3. Verify direct raw download is denied: - `GET /api/raw/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` - Expected and observed: `202 Accepted` (blocked) 4. Create share for same file: - `POST /api/share/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` - Observed: `200`, response includes `hash` (example: `qxfK3JMG`) 5. Download publicly without authentication: - `GET /api/public/dl/<hash>` - Observed (vulnerable): `200`, `Content-Type: application/pdf`, and PDF bytes are returned Live evidence captured (March 1, 2026): - `create user`: `201` - `create file`: `200` - `direct /api/raw`: `202 Accepted` - `create share`: `200` - `public download /api/public/dl/mxK-ppZb`: `200` - `public download content-type`: `application/pdf` - `public download body length`: `327` bytes ### Impact This is an **access control / authorization policy bypass** vulnerability. - **Who can exploit:** Any authenticated user granted `share=true` but denied `download`. - **Who is impacted:** Operators and organizations relying on download restrictions to prevent data export. - **What can happen:** Restricted users can still distribute and retrieve files publicly, including unauthenticated access through share URLs.

File Browser has an Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser