CVE-2026-30827

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.005 · 41 %ileDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.48% (41st) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
33 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

express-rate-limit is a basic rate-limiting middleware for Express. In versions starting from 8.0.0 and prior to versions 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2, and 8.3.0, the default keyGenerator in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (/56 by default) to all addresses that net.isIPv6() returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x), which Node.js returns as request.ip on dual-stack servers. Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a /56 (or any /32 to /80) subnet mask produces the same network key (::/56) for every IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 clients. This issue has been patched in versions 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2, and 8.3.0.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (33)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 33
05

advisories (3)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-0935Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-03-31csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1220IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-04-21csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.

  • GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gqexpress-rate-limit: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass per-client rate limiting on servers with dual-stack network2026-03-06ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary The default `keyGenerator` in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (`/56` by default) to all addresses that `net.isIPv6()` returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`), which Node.js returns as `request.ip` on dual-stack servers. Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a `/56` (or any `/32` to `/80`) subnet mask produces the same network key (`::/56`) for **every** IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 clients. ## Details ### Root Cause In `source/ip-key-generator.ts`: ```typescript export function ipKeyGenerator(ip: string, ipv6Subnet: number | false = 56) { if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) { return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}` } return ip } ``` `net.isIPv6('::ffff:192.168.1.1')` returns `true`, so IPv4-mapped addresses enter the subnet masking path. With a `/56` prefix, the start address for any `::ffff:x.x.x.x` is `::`, producing the key `::/56`. ### Proof of Concept ```javascript const { isIPv6 } = require('net'); const { Address6 } = require('ip-address'); function ipKeyGenerator(ip, ipv6Subnet = 56) { if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) { return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}`; } return ip; } console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:192.168.1.1', 56)); // ::/56 console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:10.0.0.1', 56)); // ::/56 console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:8.8.8.8', 56)); // ::/56 // ALL produce '::/56' — same bucket ``` ### End-to-End Validation On a dual-stack Express server (`app.listen(port, '::')`), tested with Express 5.2.1: - `request.ip` for IPv4 clients is `::ffff:127.0.0.1` - Rate limit key resolves to `::/56` - After `limit` requests from any IPv4 client, all other IPv4 clients receive 429 ### When This Occurs - Node.js dual-stack servers (default on Linux when listening on `::`) - Any environment where `request.ip` contains IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses - Only affects the default `keyGenerator` (custom key generators are not affected) ## Impact - **Denial of Service**: A single client can block all IPv4 traffic by exhausting the shared rate limit - **Affects default configuration**: No special options needed to trigger this ## Affected Versions All versions of express-rate-limit between v8.0.0 and v8.2.1. ## Fix This issue was fixed in commit 14e53888cdfd1b9798faf5b634c4206409e27fc4. This fix has been included in release v8.3.0, and backported to all affected minor versions in the form of releases v8.2.2, v8.1.1, and v8.0.2.

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-03-07modified 2026-06-17
08

references (7)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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