CVE-2026-28810

lowpriority · track · 15EPSS 0.003 · 19 %ileDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.27% (19th) EPSS
CVSS 3.7 · low
Is it mine?
37 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers vulnerability in Erlang/OTP kernel (inet_res, inet_db modules) allows DNS Cache Poisoning. The built-in DNS resolver (inet_res) uses a sequential, process-global 16-bit transaction ID for UDP queries and does not implement source port randomization. Response validation relies almost entirely on this ID, making DNS cache poisoning practical for an attacker who can observe one query or predict the next ID. This conflicts with RFC 5452 recommendations for mitigating forged DNS answers. inet_res is intended for use in trusted network environments and with trusted recursive resolvers. Earlier documentation did not clearly state this deployment assumption, which could lead users to deploy the resolver in environments where spoofed DNS responses are possible. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/kernel/src/inet_db.erl and lib/kernel/src/inet_res.erl. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 28.4.2, OTP 27.3.4.10 and OTP 26.2.5.19, corresponding to kernel from 3.0 before 10.6.2, 10.2.7.4 and 9.2.4.11.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 1.7–6.3

v3.13.7lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 2.2 · impact 1.4
v3.13.7lowAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (37)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-0998Erlang/OTP: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-04-07csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Erlang/OTP ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen und Daten zu manipulieren.

  • EEF-CVE-2026-28810Predictable DNS Transaction IDs Enable Cache Poisoning in Built-in Resolver2026-04-07vendor · osvUS

    ## Summary Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers vulnerability in Erlang/OTP kernel (inet\_res, inet\_db modules) allows DNS Cache Poisoning. The built-in DNS resolver (inet\_res) uses a sequential, process-global 16-bit transaction ID for UDP queries and does not implement source port randomization. Response validation relies almost entirely on this ID, making DNS cache poisoning practical for an attacker who can observe one query or predict the next ID. This conflicts with RFC 5452 recommendations for mitigating forged DNS answers. inet\_res is intended for use in trusted network environments and with trusted recursive resolvers. Earlier documentation did not clearly state this deployment assumption, which could lead users to deploy the resolver in environments where spoofed DNS responses are possible. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/kernel/src/inet\_db.erl and lib/kernel/src/inet\_res.erl. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 28.4.2, OTP 27.3.4.10 and OTP 26.2.5.19, corresponding to kernel from 3.0 before 10.6.2, 10.2.7.4 and 9.2.4.11. ## Workarounds Install the Erlang nodes in a trusted network shielded from DNS reply spoofing by firewalls, and configure the inet\_res resolver to only talk to trusted recursive name servers within that network. ## Configurations The application must use inet\_res for DNS resolution, either by configuring the lookup method to include dns in the kernel inet configuration, or by calling inet\_res functions directly. The default Erlang/OTP configuration uses native OS resolution and is not affected.

06

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

08

references (22)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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