CVE-2026-28467

Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere, nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.

### Summary Versions of the `openclaw` npm package prior to `2026.2.2` could be coerced into fetching arbitrary `http(s)` URLs during attachment/media hydration. An attacker who can influence the media URL (for example via model-controlled `sendAttachment` or auto-reply media URLs) could trigger SSRF to internal resources and exfiltrate the fetched bytes as an outbound attachment. ### Plain-English Explanation OpenClaw can send files by downloading them first. On vulnerable versions (`< 2026.2.2`), if an attacker could get OpenClaw to treat a URL as the “file to attach”, OpenClaw would download that URL from the gateway machine and then send the downloaded bytes back out as an attachment. That matters because the gateway can often reach internal-only endpoints that an attacker cannot (for example `127.0.0.1` services, private RFC1918 addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints). This is a data-leak risk. This does not directly grant code execution or shell access; it is about making the gateway perform HTTP requests and returning the response bytes. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `< 2026.2.2` - Fixed: `>= 2026.2.2` Release timeline (npm): - `2026.2.1` published `2026-02-02T11:45:27Z` - `2026.2.2` published `2026-02-04T00:56:41Z` - This advisory was created `2026-02-05T10:42:26Z` ### Details In affected versions, remote media fetching performed a raw `fetch(url)` without SSRF protections. Starting in `2026.2.2`, remote media fetching is guarded by SSRF checks (private/loopback/link-local blocking, DNS pinning, and redirect handling), so attempts to fetch `127.0.0.1`, private RFC1918 space, or cloud metadata hostnames are rejected. ### Proof of Concept From any context where an attacker can influence an attachment/media URL, provide a media URL targeting an internal endpoint (example: `http://127.0.0.1:9999/secret.txt`). On vulnerable versions (`< 2026.2.2`), the gateway fetches the URL and uses the response bytes as the attachment payload. ### Fix Fix commits: - `81c68f582d4a9a20d9cca9f367d2da9edc5a65ae` - `9bd64c8a1f91dda602afc1d5246a2ff2be164647` ### Mitigation Upgrade to `openclaw >= 2026.2.2`. Thanks @simecek for reporting.