CVE-2026-27738

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 29 %ileDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.35% (29th) EPSS
CVSS 6.9 · medium
Is it mine?
17 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in versions on the 19.x branch prior to 19.2.21, the 20.x branch prior to 20.3.17, and the 21.x branch prior to 21.1.5 and 21.2.0-rc.1. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes. This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking. In order to be vulnerable, the application must use Angular SSR, the application must have routes that perform internal redirects, the infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without sanitization, and the cache must not vary on the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header. Versions 21.2.0-rc.1, 21.1.5, 20.3.17, and 19.2.21 contain a patch. Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their`server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.9
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 2.7–6.9

v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.02.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (17)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-0534Angular SSR und Core: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-02-25csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Angular ausnutzen, um falsche Informationen darzustellen, Daten zu manipulieren und Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen.

  • GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrjAngular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix2026-02-25ghsa · osvUS

    An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`). 1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch). 2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix. 3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`. 4. The resulting string is used in the `Location` header. 5. Modern browsers interpret `//` as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from `https://your-app.com` to `https://evil.com`. ### Impact This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking: - **Scale:** A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires. - **SEO Poisoning:** Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains. - **Trust:** Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious. ### Attack Preconditions - The application must use Angular SSR. - The application must have routes that perform internal redirects. - The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without sanitization. - The cache must not vary on the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header. ### Patches - 21.2.0-rc.1 - 21.1.5 - 20.3.17 - 19.2.21 ### Workarounds Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their`server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request: ```ts app.use((req, res, next) => { const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim(); if (prefix) { // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/'); } next(); }); ``` ### Resources - [Report](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/32501) - [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32521)

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-02-25modified 2026-06-17
08

references (13)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

scry

Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.

Free scan