CVE-2026-27461

The filter query parameter in the dependency listing endpoints is JSON-decoded and the value field is concatenated directly into RLIKE clauses without sanitization or parameterized queries. Affected code in models/Dependency/Dao.php: - getFilterRequiresByPath() lines 90, 95, 100 - getFilterRequiredByPath() lines 148, 153, 158 All 6 locations use direct string concatenation like: "AND LOWER(CONCAT(o.path, o.key)) RLIKE '".$value."'" Note that $orderBy and $orderDirection in the same methods (lines 75-81) ARE properly whitelist-validated, but $value has zero sanitization. Entry points (pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle ElementController.php): - GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies (line 654) - GET /admin/element/get-required-by-dependencies (line 714) The controller JSON-decodes the filter query param and passes $filter['value'] straight to the Dao without any escaping. PoC (time-based blind): GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies?id=1&elementType=document&filter=[{"type":"string","value":"x' OR SLEEP(5)#"}] If vulnerable, the response is delayed by ~15 seconds (SLEEP runs 3 times, once per UNION arm in the inner subquery). PoC (error-based extraction): GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies?id=1&elementType=document&filter=[{"type":"string","value":"x' OR extractvalue(1,concat(0x7e,(SELECT version())))#"}] Returns the MySQL version string in the error response. Requires admin authentication. An attacker with admin panel access can extract the full database including password hashes of other admin users.