CVE-2026-23999

mediumpriority · track · 22OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.001 · 3 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.14% (3rd) EPSS
CVSS 5.5 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Fleet is open source device management software. In versions prior to 4.80.1, Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known. Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp. An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window. However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors: Physical access to the device is required, the approximate lock time must be known, the operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts, attempts would need to be spread over, and device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made. As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. No known workarounds are available.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 0.6–5.5

v3.15.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 1.8 · impact 3.6
v4.00.6lowCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:Usecondary · ENISA EU
v4.00.6lowCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.00.6lowCVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-ppwx-5jq7-px2wFleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known2026-02-26ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known. ### Impact Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp. An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window. However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors: - Physical access to the device is required. - The approximate lock time must be known. - The operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts. - Attempts would need to be spread over multiple days. - Device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made. As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds for this issue. Customers should upgrade to a patched version. ### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory: Email Fleet at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com) Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw) ### Credits Fleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.

  • GO-2026-4564Fleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known in github.com/fleetdm/fleet2026-02-27vendor · osvUS

    Fleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known in github.com/fleetdm/fleet

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-02-26modified 2026-06-17
08

references (4)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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