CVE-2026-14440

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.002 · 9 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.20% (9th) EPSS
CVSS 6.8 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cisa_csaf_it

EPSS · scored 2026-10-23

Description: To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain. Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring. Mitigation:  Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone. Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both.  Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control. Credits: David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher

01

remediations

Vendor fix, mitigation, or workaround guidance, as published by each source.

No vendor fix yet; a mitigation is available.

02

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.6
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.9–7.6

v3.16.8mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · CISA US
v3.16.8mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondaryexploitability 1.6 · impact 5.2
v4.07.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.07.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · cna@cloudflare.com
v4.04.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
03

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
04

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

05

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

06

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • VA-26-183-01Cloudflare Universal SSL CAA record override2026-07-02csaf · cisa_csaf_itUS

    Cloudflare Universal SSL automatically manages the CAA RRset for customer zones in order to issue and renew TLS certificates. In affected Universal SSL configurations, Cloudflare authoritative DNS can serve an auto-managed CAA RRset at query time that supersedes customer-configured CAA records. As a result, Certificate Authorities may not observe customer-configured RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters when evaluating CAA under RFC 8659. Customers may therefore believe strict certificate-issuance controls are enforced, while those controls are not preserved end-to-end for Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation is non-trivial and requires a strong network position plus successful domain validation, but misissuance could result in a browser-trusted TLS certificate and enable MITM against the affected domain.

07

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

08

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-07-01modified 2026-07-02
09

references (16)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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