CVE-2026-14257

Atlassian heeft kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse producten zoals Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Jira, Crowd en Fisheye. De kwetsbaarheden bevinden zich in diverse Third-Party producten waar eerder updates voor zijn verschenen. Atlassian heeft deze updates verwerkt in de eigen producten.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um SSRF-Angriffe durchzuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren, möglicherweise beliebigen Code auszuführen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Atlassian Bitbucket, Atlassian Confluence, Atlassian Crucible, Atlassian Fisheye und Atlassian Jira ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye/Crucible, Jira Software und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery-Angriffe (SSRF) durchzuführen, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe zu starten, sensible Informationen offenzulegen, Daten zu manipulieren oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.

### Summary `expand()` bounds the *number* of results it produces (the `max` option, `100_000` by default) but not their *length*. By chaining many brace groups, an attacker keeps the result count under `max` while making every result grow with the number of groups. Building `max` long results — plus the intermediate arrays combined at each brace group — exhausts memory and crashes the Node process with an **uncatchable** out-of-memory error. `try/catch` around `expand()` does not help: the fatal error terminates the process. A ~7.5 KB input (`'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)`) is enough to crash a default Node process. ### Details For `N` chained brace groups such as `'{a,b}'.repeat(N)`: - the result count is `2^N`, immediately capped at `max` (`100_000`), so the `max` protection appears to hold, but - each result is `N` characters long, so the total output size is `max × N` characters, which grows without bound in `N`. `expand_` combines each brace set with the fully-expanded tail: ```js const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''] ... for (let j = 0; j < N.length; j++) { for (let k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) { const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k] // grows one group longer per level ... expansions.push(expansion) } } ``` The loop guard `expansions.length < max` limits how many strings are built, but nothing limits how long they get. Each recursion level materializes another array of up to `max` strings, one character longer than the level below, and — because V8 represents `pre + N[j] + post[k]` as a cons-string (rope) that references `post[k]` — those intermediate strings stay reachable through the whole chain. Memory therefore scales with `max × N`. Measured on `5.0.7` (`'{a,b}'.repeat(N)`, default `max`): | groups (N) | input bytes | result count | peak RSS | |---|---|---|---| | 20 | 100 | 100,000 | ~80 MB | | 50 | 250 | 100,000 | ~214 MB | | 100 | 500 | 100,000 | ~409 MB | | 300 | 1,500 | 100,000 | ~1,148 MB | | 1500 | 7,500 | — | **OOM crash** | ### Proof of concept ```js const { expand } = require('brace-expansion') // ~7.5 KB input — crashes the process with a fatal, uncatchable OOM: // FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory try { expand('{a,b}'.repeat(1500)) } catch (e) { // never reached — the process is already dead } ``` ### Impact Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to `brace-expansion.expand()` — directly, or transitively via `minimatch` / `glob` brace patterns — can be crashed by a small request. Because the failure is a fatal V8 out-of-memory error rather than a thrown exception, it cannot be caught and it takes down the whole worker/process, denying service. ### Remediation Upgrade to a patched release. The fix bounds the total number of characters a single `expand()` call may accumulate (`EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH`, default `4_000_000`, configurable via a new `maxLength` option), applied inside the output-building loops so intermediate arrays are bounded too. Once the limit is reached, output is truncated — consistent with how `max` already truncates — instead of growing without bound. The limit sits well above any realistic expansion (100,000 results hitting `max` measure ~1M characters), so legitimate input is unaffected. After the fix, `'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)` returns a bounded, truncated result in ~0.7 s using ~340 MB and never crashes, including under a constrained 512 MB heap. The fix bounds memory but the algorithm still rebuilds intermediate arrays at each level (roughly `O(N × maxLength)` work on this input class). A streaming rewrite that produces output in `O(total output size)` can be a non-urgent follow-up. If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to `expand()` / glob brace patterns, or pass a small explicit `max` **and** `maxLength`.