CVE-2026-112946

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.009 · 58 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.85% (58th) EPSS
CVSS 6.3 · medium
Is it mine?
6 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. Prior to 6.4.4, 7.3.7, 8.1.6, 8.2.4, and 8.3.3, import analysis can record a root-relative browser URL in safeModulePaths instead of the cleaned resolved module identifier. On a network-accessible, non-Windows development server, an imported project file whose URL matches an absolute host path can authorize a later raw-filesystem request for that host file, provided server.fs.deny does not block it. The request can disclose the matching file outside the project root, but it does not allow arbitrary path traversal because the host path must correspond to a project-relative URL authorized by the application graph. This issue is fixed in versions 6.4.4, 7.3.7, 8.1.6, 8.2.4, and 8.3.3.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 1.7–6.3

v4.06.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.01.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (6)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine2026-10-21ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary The content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned. The content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `<project-root>/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host's `/etc/hosts` file. ### Impact Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or the [`server.host` option](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host)) - contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host - The sensitive file is not matched by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) - the dev server is not running on Windows ### Details When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as `/etc/hostname`. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with `fsPathFromUrl` and adds the result to `safeModulePaths`. Because `fsPathFromUrl` ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL `/etc/hostname` is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path `/etc/hostname`. For a later request to `/@fs/etc/hostname`, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets `/etc/hostname` as an absolute path. The access check applies `server.fs.deny`, then accepts paths present in `safeModulePaths` before checking `server.fs.allow`. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated `safeModulePaths`. ### PoC The following example requires Linux with a readable `/etc/hostname`: ```bash $ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc $ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc $ npm init -y $ npm install vite@8.3.1 $ mkdir -p etc $ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname $ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js $ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1 ``` In another terminal: ```bash $ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js 200 $ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname 200 $ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file' response matches host file ```

06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-10-20modified 2026-10-20
07

references (7) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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