CVE-2026-111059

## Summary Mercury turns Jupyter notebooks into shared web apps/dashboards. The `mr.Markdown` widget converts its input to HTML with **python-markdown and no sanitization step**. `MarkdownWidget` is an `ipywidgets.HTML` widget, whose value is written to the page as **raw HTML (via `innerHTML`) with no sanitization**, so the result reaches the DOM verbatim. When an app passes **untrusted data** (database rows, user submissions, uploaded file contents, or an external/LLM API response) to `mr.Markdown`, HTML/JS in that data executes in the browser of **whoever views the app** — a data-driven stored/DOM-based XSS. This is a library-provided rendering sink that fails to neutralize output; it is triggered by ordinary, reasonable application code, not by an author mistake. ## Root cause `mercury/md.py` — `MarkdownWidget._to_html()` (verified at v3.2.6, lines ~57–65): ```python def _to_html(self, text: str) -> str: if md_lib is not None: body = md_lib.markdown(text) # python-markdown: passes raw HTML through else: body = f"<pre>{escape(text)}</pre>" # escape() is ONLY the md-lib-absent fallback return self._apply_inline_theme(body) # regex styling — adds style=, removes nothing ``` Two neutralization failures compound: 1. **Markdown → HTML is unsanitized.** `python-markdown` passes raw HTML through by default: `<img src=x onerror=…>`, `<svg onload=…>`, and `javascript:` links survive verbatim. There is no `bleach`/`nh3` allowlist anywhere in the package. `_apply_inline_theme()` only injects inline `style=` attributes via regex; it is not a sanitizer and removes nothing. `escape()` runs only in the md-lib-absent fallback. 2. **The rendering sink is unsanitized `innerHTML`.** `MarkdownWidget` (`mercury/md.py:21`) subclasses `ipywidgets.HTML`. The ipywidgets HTML widget renders its `value` into the DOM as raw HTML via `innerHTML`, with no sanitization (this is the widget's design). Event-handler payloads such as `<img src=x onerror=…>` therefore execute when the widget is displayed. **On the "sanitize" that exists:** `mercury_app/notebook_sanitize.py` (`sanitize_notebook_for_mercury_runtime`) and `packages/lab/src/mercury/save.ts` (`sanitizeMercuryNotebookContent`) strip *runtime metadata* and clear *code-cell saved outputs*. They do **not** neutralize HTML/JS, and they do not touch widget values or markdown source. "Sanitize" here is notebook hygiene, not XSS defense. ## Threat model (attacker → victim, not self-inflicted) The CVE-relevant framing is **data-driven**: the app author writes ordinary code, and the *data* is attacker-controlled. ```python import mercury as mr # `row` comes from a DB / user submission / uploaded file / external API — # i.e. NOT authored by the app developer: mr.Markdown(row["comment"]) ``` The attacker supplies the untrusted value (posts the comment, uploads the file, poisons the API/RAG source). A **different** user — another app user, a reviewer, an admin — then opens the app, and the payload executes in *their* browser. The vulnerable component (Mercury's server-side widget rendering) and the impacted component (the victim's browser session in the app origin) differ, which is the classic stored-XSS attacker/victim separation. **Amplifier — session sharing (`--keep-session`).** Mercury can serve one shared kernel session to all viewers (`mercury run … --keep-session`, README "Arguments": "share the same session between multiple users … others will see this"). It is **opt-in and defaults to off** (`keepSession=False` in `mercury_app/handlers.py`), so it is *not required* for the base case — any app that renders one user's untrusted data to another user is already vulnerable. When enabled, content one viewer submits is rendered into the session other viewers see, extending this to cross-user delivery. Authentication is **opt-in and off by default**: a free password gate exists (`mercury run … --pass=…`, README), while user-based authentication is a paid add-on. Because auth is off unless the operator enables it, unauthenticated public deployments — where the attacker needs no account — are a realistic default. ## Proof of Concept ```python import mercury as mr # Value that would realistically arrive from untrusted data (DB row, form field, # uploaded file, API/LLM response): untrusted = '<img src=x onerror=alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))>' mr.Markdown(untrusted) # rendered to raw HTML, unsanitized, into the app DOM ``` The generated widget HTML contains the payload verbatim; when the widget is displayed, the `onerror` handler runs. ### What was confirmed (and how) - **Confirmed by execution in a real browser (sink level):** driving the *actual `python-markdown` output* into the same `ipywidgets.HTML` `value` sink the widget uses causes the payload to execute in headless Chromium. Execution was captured via Playwright's `dialog` event (which fires only on a genuine `alert()`, so the mere presence of the string in the HTML cannot cause a false positive). A benign control (`**hello**`) produced **zero** dialogs, confirming the harness reports only real execution. `python-markdown` passes `<img src=x onerror=…>` through verbatim by default (behavior is not version-specific). - **Reasoned from source (not executed end-to-end):** the full path from a `mr.Markdown(...)` call in a *served Mercury app* to a viewer's DOM was not run end-to-end, because no isolated container/VM was available in the reporting environment. Because `MarkdownWidget` *is* the `ipywidgets.HTML` sink above and Mercury's frontend applies no sanitizer to widget HTML values (the only frontend sanitizer strips notebook metadata at save time), the served-app path is expected to behave identically. Reproduce end-to-end before publishing if you want the advisory to state full-path browser confirmation. ## Impact Mercury shares notebooks as web apps/dashboards, often for non-technical audiences. When an app renders untrusted data through `mr.Markdown`, the generated page carries attacker-controlled script that runs in the browser of any other viewer, in the app origin — enabling session/cookie/token theft, UI spoofing and forced actions as the victim, and pivoting within the hosting origin. With `--keep-session`, this extends to cross-user delivery within a shared session. ## Severity rationale (CVSS 3.1 per-metric) Base score reflects the realistic default: an unauthenticated deployment whose app renders untrusted data via `mr.Markdown`. | Metric | Value | Reason | |---|---|---| | **AV** Attack Vector | **Network (N)** | App is served over HTTP to remote users. | | **AC** Attack Complexity | **Low (L)** | No special conditions or race; supply data that reaches an `mr.Markdown` call. | | **PR** Privileges Required | **None (N)** | Baseline: the injection channel (public form/upload/API) needs no account; auth is optional/paid. See variant below. | | **UI** User Interaction | **Required (R)** | A victim must open/view the app page for the stored payload to run. | | **S** Scope | **Changed (C)** | The vulnerable component (server-side widget render) injects script that executes in a different security authority — the victim's browser session/origin. (This is the canonical XSS scoping in the CVSS 3.1 spec.) | | **C** Confidentiality | **Low (L)** | Script can read data/session material available to the app origin; scored L (not H) for a generic app without asserting full account takeover. | | **I** Integrity | **Low (L)** | Script can alter the page and act as the victim within the app; scored L generically. | | **A** Availability | **None (N)** | No direct availability impact. | Result: **`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` = 6.1 (Medium)**. Deployment-dependent variants (state your environment's when filing): - Injection channel requires an authenticated low-privilege user → **PR:L** → `…/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` = **5.4**. - App origin exposes high-value auth material such that XSS yields full session/account takeover → **C:H/I:H** raises the score; justify per deployment rather than claiming it universally. ## Remediation Primary — **sanitize by default in `mr.Markdown`, with an explicit opt-out for the deliberate raw-HTML use case** (backward-compatible, non-breaking): ```python # mercury/md.py def _to_html(self, text: str, unsafe_allow_html: bool = False) -> str: if md_lib is not None: body = md_lib.markdown(text) else: body = f"<pre>{escape(text)}</pre>" if not unsafe_allow_html: # allowlist tags/attributes; strip javascript:/data: schemes and event handlers body = nh3.clean(body) # or bleach.clean(..., strip=True) return self._apply_inline_theme(body) ``` Expose `unsafe_allow_html=False` on `mr.Markdown(...)` so authors who deliberately embed trusted raw HTML can opt in, while the default is safe. This mirrors the convention used by comparable tools (e.g. Streamlit's `unsafe_allow_html`). Defense-in-depth: since widget HTML values are written via `innerHTML` without sanitization, consider sanitizing widget HTML values at the frontend before they reach the DOM, and/or serving a Content-Security-Policy that forbids inline event handlers, so a single missed sink is not immediately exploitable. ## Additional hardening (secondary — not the reported vulnerability) Several widget ESMs write the **label** with `innerHTML`, e.g. `mercury/text.py` `topLabel.innerHTML = model.get("label") || …` (same shape in `number.py`, `time.py`, `date`/`datetime`/`daterange`/`select`/`json`/`file`, and `indicator.py`'s `_card_html`). **This is not an attacker→victim XSS path**: labels are static strings set by the app author in Python; URL/`url_params` overrides affect only widget `value` (assigned via the safe `input.value` property), never `label`, so there is no end-user/URL route into a label. It is a defense-in-depth / author footgun only. Recommended regardless: render UI strings with `textContent`, or `html.escape` labels, so output encoding is applied uniformly.