CVE-2026-10774

mediumpriority · track · 26EPSS 0.003 · 22 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.29% (22nd) EPSS
CVSS 6.5 · medium
Is it mine?
2 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subnet key management leaks one PSA Crypto key slot on every subnet-key teardown. In subsys/bluetooth/mesh/subnet.c, net_keys_create() imports the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot under CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS (enabled by default), but subnet_keys_destroy() guarded the matching psa_destroy_key() with CONFIG_BT_MESH_V1d1. That Kconfig symbol was removed when explicit Mesh 1.0.1 support was dropped, so the destroy branch became permanently dead code and the import is never balanced by a destroy. The imbalanced teardown is reached every time subnet keys are destroyed: deleting a subnet (Config Server NetKey Delete), completing a Key Refresh Procedure (which retires the old key set), and resetting/re-provisioning the node. The over-the-air triggers are processed only under the node's device key, so they are exercisable by the provisioner or network administrator that owns the node, reachable over the Bluetooth Mesh network. With the default CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT of 16, repeated add/delete or key-refresh cycles exhaust the shared PSA key-slot pool after roughly a dozen rounds. Once exhausted, bt_mesh_private_beacon_key() and thus subnet creation fail: the node can no longer add subnets or complete key refresh, and other PSA crypto consumers on the device may be starved, until the device is rebooted. The fix aligns the destroy guard with the import guard (CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS) so each slot is freed.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 2.4–6.5

v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 2.8 · impact 3.6
v3.12.4lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.12.4lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Lsecondary · vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.orgexploitability 0.9 · impact 1.4
v3.16mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (2)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

also known as (2)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

06

sources

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published 2026-08-02modified 2026-10-23
07

references (7)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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