CVE-2026-104861

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 36 %ileFRUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.43% (36th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
2 sources
osv · certfr

EPSS · scored 2026-10-23

probe-image-size gets image dimensions without downloading the entire file. Prior to 7.4.0, lib/parse_sync/svg.js and lib/parse_stream/svg.js use the searching regular expression /<[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^>]*>/, which repeatedly scans to the end of input when attacker-controlled data contains many less-than characters without a closing greater-than character. The synchronous parser converts and scans the full supplied buffer without an input cap, while the streaming parser reparses the complete accumulated SVG prefix for every received chunk. The probe.sync(), probe(stream), and probe(url) entry points can therefore block the Node.js event loop at full CPU, and attacker-controlled chunking can amplify the streaming cost. This issue is fixed in version 7.4.0.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrcprobe-image-size: Quadratic-time Denial of Service in the SVG Parser2026-10-02ghsa · osvUS

    ## Overview `probe-image-size` scans the SVG header with a searching regular expression, `/<[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^>]*>/`. On input that contains many `<` characters but no `>`, the engine restarts the `[^>]*` scan at every `<` position and runs to end of input each time, giving quadratic time complexity. Both the synchronous and the streaming parser are affected. ## Impact Every entry point that reaches the SVG parser is affected: `probe.sync()`, `probe(stream)` and `probe(url)`. The URL form is the most exposed one — the input is fetched from a remote host, so an attacker only needs to supply a link. Processing a crafted buffer blocks the Node.js event loop at 100% CPU for the whole duration. In production environments such as upload validators, image proxies or link unfurl services, a small number of concurrent requests is enough to deny service. ## Root Cause Analysis Two independent problems. 1. **Absence of input size cap in the sync path.** `lib/parse_sync/svg.js` copied the entire buffer into a string and matched against it. There was no size limit at all, so cost scaled with the size of the attacker-supplied buffer. 2. **Repeated rescanning in the stream path.** `lib/parse_stream/svg.js` did cap accumulated data at 64 KB, but called `parseSvg(str)` on the whole accumulated string on *every* chunk, giving `O(chunks × N²)`. The cap does not help here: the more chunks the input is split into, the more times the quadratic scan is repeated. Chunk size is influenced by the sender. `highWaterMark` (16 KB) is a buffering threshold, not a lower bound — a socket read returns whatever has arrived. A server that writes one byte at a time produces one-byte chunks; this was confirmed against the real `needle` pipeline with default options. The original report identified (1) only, and stated that the 64 KB cap mitigates the streaming path. It does not. ## Proof of Concept (PoC) Synchronous: ```js const probe = require('probe-image-size') // ~200 KB of '<a' — contains '<' but never '>' probe.sync(Buffer.from('<a'.repeat(100000), 'latin1')) ``` Streaming — the same payload split into chunks, slower per byte than the synchronous form: ```js const { Readable } = require('stream') const probe = require('probe-image-size') const payload = Buffer.from('<a'.repeat(32768), 'latin1') const chunks = [] for (let i = 0; i < payload.length; i += 4096) chunks.push(payload.subarray(i, i + 4096)) await probe(Readable.from(chunks)) ``` Measurements on the maintainer's machine: | path | input | time | | --- | --- | --- | | `probe.sync()` | 25 KB | 0.9 s | | `probe.sync()` | 50 KB | 5.5 s | | `probe.sync()` | 100 KB | 18 s | | `probe.sync()` | 200 KB | 54 s | | `probe(stream)` | 64 KB, 1 chunk | 1.6 s | | `probe(stream)` | 64 KB, 4 chunks | 2.9 s | | `probe(stream)` | 64 KB, 16 chunks | 9.6 s |

  • CERTFR-2026-AVI-1378Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits IBMFrançais2026-10-23vendor · certfrFR
06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-10-02modified 2026-10-02
07

references (5) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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