CVE-2026-104437

# `Zebra` Transparent `SIGHASH_SINGLE` Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From `zcashd` ### Summary For V5+ transparent spends, `Zebra` and `zcashd` disagree on the same consensus rule: `SIGHASH_SINGLE` must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. `zcashd` treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while `Zebra`'s transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing. The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by `Zebra`, retained in `Zebra`'s mempool, selected into `Zebra` `getblocktemplate`, mined into a block, and then rejected by `zcashd`. ### Details Validated code revisions used during analysis: - `zcashd`: `2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5` - `Zebra`: `a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb` Scope note: - earlier triage material grouped pre-V5 and V5 behavior together; - re-execution on the pinned revisions did not reproduce the claimed pre-V5 / V4 reject-side behavior; - this advisory therefore covers the V5+ / ZIP-244 variant only. `zcashd` side: - Transparent scripts in blocks are checked through `TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig()` and `SignatureHash()`: [`zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`](https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1386-L1407). - In the ZIP-244 branch, `SignatureHash()` explicitly throws when `SIGHASH_SINGLE` or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` is used with `nIn >= txTo.vout.size()`: [`zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`](https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1221-L1259). - `CheckSig()` catches that exception and returns `false`, causing the transparent script to fail. `Zebra` side: - V5 transparent inputs route into the same FFI-based transparent script verifier used for block validation: [`zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs#L989-L1098). - `Zebra` converts the decoded hash type and asks its Rust sighash engine for a digest without adding the corresponding-output pre-check that `zcashd` enforces first: [`zebra/zebra-script/src/lib.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-script/src/lib.rs#L160-L175), [`zebra/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs#L307-L343). - `Zebra` forwards canonical `SIGHASH_SINGLE` into the Rust ZIP-244 implementation. - In that implementation, when `input.index() >= bundle.vout.len()`, the code uses `transparent_outputs_hash::<TxOut>(&[])` instead of erroring: [`zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs`](https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash/blob/c3425f9c3c7f6deb20720bb78b18f35fbbed8edd/zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs#L101-L107), [`zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs`](https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash/blob/c3425f9c3c7f6deb20720bb78b18f35fbbed8edd/zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs#L131-L139). Why this is exploitable: - the malformed transaction only needs fewer transparent outputs than inputs; - the attacker signs the digest that `Zebra` computes for the missing-output case; - `Zebra` then sees a valid transparent signature, while `zcashd` never reaches the same digest because it fails first. Ordinary path viability: - `zcashd` ordinary mempool admission is not the practical trigger path, because the same ZIP-244 `SignatureHash()` checks fail there first: [`zcash/src/main.cpp`](https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/main.cpp#L1981-L1995), [`zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp`](https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1221-L1259). - `Zebra` ordinary mempool admission is viable because `Zebra` uses the same transparent verifier for mempool and block validation and does not have a separate "one output per input" standardness rule here: [`zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs#L414-L519), [`zebra/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs#L255-L376). - `Zebra` is a block-template producer, so the realistic stock path is `Zebra` mempool -> `Zebra` `getblocktemplate` -> external miner: [`zebra/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs#L72-L105). ### PoC Validated commits: - `zcashd`: `2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5` - `Zebra`: `a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb` Manual reproduction steps: 1. Build an otherwise-valid V5 transaction with at least two transparent inputs and only one transparent output. 2. Sign input `0` normally. 3. Sign input `1` with canonical `SIGHASH_SINGLE` or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY`. 4. Use the digest returned by `Zebra`'s ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributes `transparent_outputs_hash([])`. 5. Submit the transaction to `Zebra` and to `zcashd`. 6. Observe: - `Zebra` accepts it into the mempool; - `Zebra` selects it into `getblocktemplate`; - `Zebra` can mine and accept a block containing it; - `zcashd` rejects it in the ordinary mempool path. ### Impact This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split. Who can trigger it: - an ordinary transaction author can craft the malformed V5 transparent transaction; - the accept-side stock path is `Zebra`'s mempool and block-template path; - an external miner still has to include the transaction in a block for the split to materialize. Who is impacted: - `Zebra` can accept and template a transaction / block that `zcashd` rejects; - this makes the issue both a consensus-divergence problem and a practical `Zebra` block-template safety problem.