CVE-2026-100699

## Summary Nodemailer's address parser can produce an unexpected recipient address when an RFC 5322 comment follows the domain of an address whose local-part is a quoted string. For example: ```text "user"@example.com(x)evil.com ``` is parsed as: ```text { address: "user@example.com evil.com", name: "" } ``` The resulting address therefore contains additional attacker-controlled domain text separated by a literal space. The parsed `.address` value is subsequently propagated into the SMTP envelope: ```text src/addressparser/index.ts ↓ recipient.address ↓ src/mime-node/index.ts ↓ envelope.to ``` The envelope construction uses the parsed address without another strict address validation step. This appears to be a variant of the RFC 5322 comment parsing issue addressed by GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83, but it follows a different parser path when the local-part is quoted. ## Reproduction Input: ```text "user"@example.com(x)evil.com ``` Observed parser output: ```text address: "user@example.com evil.com" name: "" ``` A second example: ```text "a"@b.com(c)d.com(e)f.com ``` produces: ```text address: "a@b.com d.com f.com" name: "" ``` For comparison, the corresponding unquoted form: ```text user@example.com(x)evil.com ``` takes a different code path and is handled by the existing protection differently. ## Technical Details The issue is caused by different parsing behavior for quoted and unquoted local-parts. The quoted-local-part variant allows the comment-separated trailing domain atoms to remain in the resulting `.address` value. That value is then used when constructing the message envelope: ```text envelope.to = recipients.map(to => to.address as string) ``` No additional strict recipient validation is performed at this boundary. ## Security Impact The confirmed impact is that attacker-controlled comment content can result in a malformed/ambiguous recipient address being accepted by the parser and propagated into `envelope.to`. The reporter did **not confirm successful delivery to an unintended recipient through a real SMTP server using this exact quoted-local-part variant**. The remaining question is how real SMTP servers and other Nodemailer transports handle an envelope recipient containing a value such as: ```text user@example.com evil.com ``` An end-to-end SMTP test is required to determine whether this parser behavior results in an exploitable delivery or recipient-validation bypass. ## Relationship to GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83 This report is intended as a potential variant/follow-up to GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83. The existing advisory addresses RFC 5322 comment handling in email domains. This report identifies a separate parser path involving quoted local-parts that can preserve additional domain-like content in the normalized address. Please evaluate whether this behavior is already covered by the existing fix or represents a remaining parser variant. ## Suggested Fix The parser should consistently reject or correctly terminate addresses containing trailing domain atoms after RFC 5322 comments, regardless of whether the local-part is quoted. In particular: ```text "user"@example.com(x)evil.com ``` should not result in: ```text user@example.com evil.com ``` The envelope-generation layer should also avoid assuming that a parser-produced address is safe for SMTP delivery without appropriate validation. ## Verification Status Confirmed: * Parser accepts the quoted-local-part variant. * Parser produces an address containing additional attacker-controlled text. * The resulting address is propagated into `envelope.to`. Not confirmed by reporter: * Successful delivery through a real SMTP server. * Delivery to an unintended recipient. * Exploitability against a specific downstream SMTP implementation.